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THE CONSTITUTIONALLY INSPIRED APPROACHES TO
POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
IN THE U.S. AND SOUTH AFRICA: CONSERVATION VERSUS
TRANSFORMATION
ChristopherJ. Roederert
"I owe allegiance to my country, there it owes me protection, and
wherever my Government owes me no protection I owe it no allegiance
and can commit no treason."
- Representative John Martin Broomall1
I.

INTRODUCTION

In this last term, the highest courts in the U.S. and South Africa,
respectively, the United States Supreme Court in Town of Castle Rock,
Colorado v. Gonzales2 and the South African Constitutional Court in N.K.
v. Minister of Safety and Security,' overturned decisions from their
appellate courts, the Tenth Circuit 4 and the Supreme Court of Appeals.5
Castle Rock involved the failure of the police to enforce a restraining order
under a "mandatory enforcement" statute resulting in the death of Ms.
Gonzales' three daughters, while N.K. involved the rape of a stranded
woman by three on-duty uniformed police officers who offered to give her

t Associate Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law; Senior Research Fellow,
University of the Witwatersrand School of Law. The author thanks Florida Coastal School
of Law for its generous summer research grant, Amanda Jack and Charlene Poblette for
their most able research assistance and Ericka Curran, Brian Foley, Susan Harthill, Thomas
Hornsby, Darren Latham, Julia McLaughlin, and Nicola Sharpe for helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this work.
1. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1263 (1866).
2. 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005).
3. NK v. Minister of Safety and Security, 2005 CCT 52/04 (S. Afr.), available at
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/uhtbin/hyperion-image/J-CCT52-04.
4. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093 (10th Cir. 2004).
5. N.K. v Ministerof Safety and Sec. 2005 (3) SA 179 (SCA) (S. Afr.).
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a ride home. Although the main legal issues in these cases are not directly
on point, both cases address the important issue of the duties of the police;
their accountability to the public, and the rights of women to be free from
violence, and/or to be protected from violence by the police. The question
in Castle Rock was whether Ms. Gonzales could establish that she has a
property right in the enforcement of a restraining order that was worthy of
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process protection, while the question in
N.K. was whether Police Services and the Minister of Safety and Security
could be held vicariously liable for the gross dereliction of duty on the part
of the officers.
N.K. drew on another very important South African constitutional
judgment, the case of Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Security,' which,
like Castle Rock, was a case heard on exception. Carmichele's facts are
perhaps more directly on point, as they involved the failure of the police
and prosecution to act on behalf of the plaintiff to put evidence before the
Court to oppose the bail of a criminal defendant who was a dangerous
sexual offender, despite numerous pleas by concerned parties. It was
alleged that this failure resulted in the release of the criminal defendant
and the subsequent vicious attack on Ms. Carmichele. Castle Rock and
Carmichele share an important doctrinal issue, the question of whether the
duties in question can give rise to a right of the plaintiff to expect the
police to come to her aid. Both cases addressed the issue of the general
duty rule and the exception to that rule, which is created when a special
relationship is established between the plaintiff, or her class, and the
police. All three cases are torts cases (or the South African counterpart,
delict cases) that depend on the courts' respective interpretations of their
constitutions to determine if the plaintiff would be afforded a remedy.
This article is not primarily concerned with a comparison of the
doctrinal nuances of these three cases, or of the respective constitutional
mechanisms that aided the courts in coming to their decisions. This article

6. 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) (S. Afr.) (applying the Constitution to find that a legal duty
may have existed on the police and prosecutor, and that they may have breached that duty
when they recommended the release without bail of a Mr. Coetzee without placing before
the magistrate any information regarding Mr. Coetzee's previous convictions and history of
sexual violence where Mr. Coetzee subsequently violently attacked the plaintiff), remanded
to Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2003 (2) SA 656 (CC) (S. Afr.)
(finding that the police and prosecution owed the plaintiff a legal duty and had failed in
carrying out the duty).
7. See infra Part II (A)(1) for further discussion of the rule.
8. On one level, these opinions draw on very different constitutional mechanisms for
their resolution. The Castle Rock decision is based on the Court's interpretation of
"property" under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment while the South

2005]

POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY

examines the comparison, or rather, the sharp contrast between the values
The respective Courts'
and spirit animating these decisions.'
interpretations of the underlying values, or spirit of their constitutions,
either help forge a special relationship between the victims and the police,
thereby altering the existing distribution of entitlement and duties, or they
hinder those attempts. The contrast is between a court that views its
constitution as a progressive covenant between the people and its
government, which fosters a culture of justification and accountability, and
a court that views its constitution as a charter of negative liberties, which
will go to great lengths to conserve the status quo distribution of rights and
entitlements. 10 One is intent on protecting the vulnerable members of its
society, and the other is skeptical of attempts by the legislature to do so
through the creation of new rights.
Part I provides a brief summary of the Supreme Court decision in
Castle Rock, highlighting the fact that the Supreme Court went to
considerable lengths to undermine the plaintiff's entitlement to the
mandatory enforcement of the restraining order, an entitlement that she
was granted under both state legislation and the court order itself. The
Supreme Court came to this result by concluding: (1) that contrary to its
plain meaning, the statute could not be interpreted as providing mandatory
enforcement and instead gave police discretion to decide whether to
enforce the restraining order; (2) that the Court need not certify the
African cases rely on provisions of the South African Constitution which require that every
development of the common law be in compliance with the "spirit, purport and objects of
the Bill of Rights." S. AFR. CONST. 1994. On another level, it will be argued that Justice
Scalia's majority opinion in Castle Rock also draws on what he holds to be the spirit of the
U.S. Constitution, although he is less explicit in doing so.
9. Acting Judge Budlender in Rates Action Group v City of Cape Town, 2004 (5) SA
545, 569 (Cape Provincial Division) (S.Afr.) at paragraph 100 contrasted justice Scalia's
"obstructionist" view of the role of constitutions to the transformative role of South
Africa's constitution. For Justice Scalia, "the whole purpose of a constitution, old or new..
. is to impede change or pejoratively put 'to obstruct modernity.'" (citing A. Scalia,
Modernity and the Constitutionin E. SMITH (ED) CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE UNDER OLD
CONSTITUTIONS (1995) quoted in G. van Bueren, Including the Excluded: The Case for an
Economic, Social and CulturalHuman Rights Act, PUBLIC LAW 456, 457 (2002)). As Acting
Judge Budlender went on to say, "Whatever the position may be in the USA or other
countries, that is not the purpose of our Constitution. Our Constitution provides a
mandate, a framework and, to some extent, a blueprint for the transformation of our
society from its racist and unequal past to a society in which all can live with dignity." Id.
10. The status quo is not a condition of equality. A laissez faire approach to an unequal
"private" realm perpetuates inequalities. Note that the Supreme Court in Gonzales
privileges this laissez faire view of the Constitution in spite of Justice Holmes' claim in his
dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[A]
constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of
paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire.").
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question of the statute's interpretation to the Colorado Supreme Court; (3)
that the Court need not defer to the Tenth Circuit decision in the case,
notwithstanding a general policy and precedent that it do so in issues of
state law; and (4) that notwithstanding the specific requirements and
purposes of the statute, Ms. Gonzales and other Colorado residents had no
right to anything other than the general protections of law enforcement
accorded to all residents. The Court goes so far as to hold that it is
virtually impossible for a state to create legislation that can forge a
relationship between the police and those with restraining orders that is
special enough to rise to the level of a property right for the purposes of
procedural Due Process protection.1
The Supreme Court decision was not mandated by the text of the
Constitution or the text of the Colorado legislation. Neither was it
mandated by the respective drafting history or purposes of the texts. The
Supreme Court made a choice to reach into the Colorado legislation and
interpret it in such a way as to defeat Ms. Gonzales' property right, and in
turn, her Fourteenth Amendment Due Process right. The Court's main
argument throughout its opinion was that in spite of the plain language,
the history and purpose of the legislation, the police still had discretion
under the statute. In effect, the Court ignored the actual Colorado
legislation and found, almost as a matter of constitutional law, that the
police have discretion to arbitrarily ignore restraining orders. The Court
nowhere articulates a principled justification for doing so. The largely,
although not completely,"2 unarticulated principle underlying the decision

11. This is similar to the Court's decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555
(1992), which denied standing to plaintiffs suing under 16 U.S.C. § 1540g (2000), the
Endangered Species Act (Act), challenging a regulation providing that the United States
would not comply with the Act outside of the United States. The Act provided for civil
suits to enjoin the United States for violation of the Act. Nonetheless, Justice Scalia writing
for the majority held that Congress cannot authorize standing for generalized grievances, as
the prohibition is based on Article III rather than prudential grounds, as had been held in
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). This, in effect, precludes Congress from creating
or expanding justiciable rights to the preservation of endangered species or to create other
rights based on generalized harms to the public. See Cass Sunstein, What's Standing After
Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992). As will be
demonstrated below, the right in question in Castle Rock is not of this broad nature, but is
for a specific person under specific conditions. Nonetheless, the result is similar in that the
Court is taking it upon itself to thwart the decision of the elected branches to create or
extend the rights of the people and to impose duties on the state. The result is less
accountability of the executive branch.
12. E.g. Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 125 S.Ct. 2796, 2809 (2005) ("The
creation of a personal entitlement to something as vague and novel as enforcement of
restraining orders cannot 'simply g[o] without saying.' ... Such a right would not, of course,
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is that the underlying property claim was new, and if recognized, it would
alter the existing common law distribution of entitlements and duties. It
would provide those with restraining orders (primarily women) with a
right to enforcement, would require that police officers execute their
duties, and would hold municipalities liable when those rights were denied
without Due Process of law.
Part II will shift to another world, both geographically and legally, and
will address the decision of the South African Constitutional Court in
Carmichele. In contrast to the decision in Castle Rock, the Court in
Carmichele is explicit that it is purposefully reading the Constitution and
the relevant legislation in question to further the values of the
Constitution. Unlike Castle Rock, the Court does not decide the final
issue, but remands the case to the trial court to hear the case on the merits.
The South African Constitutional Court distinguishes its approach from
the negative liberties approach of the U.S., by noting that the South
African Constitution's provisions point towards a positive duty to prevent
harm. 3 Finally, unlike the Court in Castle Rock, the Court in Carmichele
took into consideration the historically vulnerable place of women within
society, as well as South Africa's international obligations, in interpreting
both the duties of the state to protect women from violence and the rights
of the plaintiff in the case to be protected from violence. These factors,
combined with the facts of the case, forge the special relationship required
to impose a duty on the defendants and to establish the legally enforceable
rights of the plaintiff.
Part III continues with a similar approach to the duties of the police
and the rights of victims in the context of vicarious liability. The case of
N.K. explicitly draws on the decision of the Constitutional Court in
Carmichele, but it also brings out the contrast between a conservative,
libertarian approach to vicarious liability, which favors minimal
responsibility of employers, including the state, for the conduct of
employees, and the constitutionally inspired approach, which places
greater responsibility for the safety of the public and accountability of

resemble any traditional conception of property." (quoting 125 S. Ct. at 2821 n.16 (Stevens,
J. dissenting)).
13. Note, however, that the provisions of the South African Constitution and the South
African Police Act are not as specific as the Colorado legislation and restraining order in
Castle Rock that created the purported property entitlement for that specific plaintiff.
Compare infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text, with infra notes 142-147 and
accompanying text. Neither is the South African Constitution as clear as the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause, along with federal legislation, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003),
giving the plaintiff in Castle Rock the cause of action. Compare note 12, with infra notes
142-146 and accompanying text.
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employers and the state for the risks and harms they impose on the public.
N.K., like Carmichele, and unlike Castle Rock, fosters a culture of public
accountability and of protecting the rights of vulnerable members of its
society. On almost every conceivable view of democracy, the South
African decisions and approach are better than the decision and approach
taken in Castle Rock.
II.

CASTLE ROCK

A. Introduction
Ms. Gonzales sued the City of Castle Rock, Colorado under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, and the Fourteenth Amendment procedural Due Process Clause. l"
Her claim was "that she had a property interest in police enforcement of
the restraining order against her husband; and that the town deprived her
of this property without due process by having a policy that tolerated
nonenforcement of restraining orders."' 5 The alleged facts were required
to be accepted as true by the Court because the case was heard on
exception. Specifically, "that her deprivation was not the result of random
and unauthorized behavior by the individual officers. Rather... the
deprivation was the result of a custom and policy of the City of Castle
Rock not to enforce domestic abuse protective orders.' ' 16 Her claim was
one of reckless disregard for her right to police protection," which took
place "when its police officers.., failed to respond properly to her
repeated reports that her estranged husband was violating the terms of a
restraining order."' 8 This failure by the police resulted in her estranged
husband killing their three daughters, putting their bodies in the cab of his

14. Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2802-03 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 and Civil
Action for Deprivation of Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003): "The Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution provides that a State shall not "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." Amend. XIV, § 1. In 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
Congress has created a federal cause of action for "the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."). See Christopher Roederer, Another
Case in Lochner's Legacy, the Court's Assault on New Property: The Right to the Mandatory
Enforcement of a Restraining Order is "a Sham, Nullity and Cruel Deception," 54 DRAKE L.
REV. (forthcoming 2006).
15. Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2803. Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1116 ("Indeed, the process
would only take minutes to perform, and includes tasks officers regularly perform in the
course of their daily duties.").
16. Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1112-13.
17. Id. at 1113 (quoting Aplt. Appx. at 12).
18. Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2800.
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pickup truck, and driving to the police station where he opened fire on the
police, who returned fire and killed him. 9
Her property right claim was based on the Colorado legislation, as
well as the actual restraining order issued against her husband. In 1994,
Colorado joined a wave of states that enacted legislation to address this
very problem; 20 the problem of death and injury to victims of domestic
violence caused in part by the custom of police to avoid the enforcement of
restraining orders.2 The Colorado General Assembly passed legislation
targeting domestic violence in general,22 and the mandatory enforcement
of restraining orders in particular. Section 18-6-803.5 of the Colorado
Revised Statutes Annotated entitled "Crime of violation of a protection
order - penalty - peace officers' duties" states, "[a] peace officer shall use
every reasonable means to enforce a protection order,, 23 and further
clarifies the duty by stating:

19. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, begins the opinion by acknowledging the
horrible facts in the case. Id. at 2800-02.
20. Id. at 2818 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that nineteen states mandate arrest for
domestic restraining order violations). G. Kristian Miccio puts the number at twenty-nine.
G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided:Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the
Conservatization of the Battered Women's Movement, 42 Hous. L. REV. 237 n.2 (2005). I
would like to add six other jurisdictions to her list, for a total of thirty-five U.S. states and
territories. See Roederer, supra note 14, at Appendix A.
21. One of the most important factors leading to the development of mandatory arrest
laws has been the consistent dismissive attitude that police have displayed toward domestic
violence. Marion Wanless, Mandatory Arrest: A Step Toward Eradication of Domestic
Violence, But is it Enough?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 533, 542 (1996). Almost every state now
allows police officers to make an arrest without a warrant when the officer has probable
cause to believe that domestic violence has occurred. Id. at 541. "However, police officers
have made little use of their expanded arrest power. Even when probable cause is clearly
present, police officers still frequently try to calm the parties and act as mediators." Id.
Further, Wanless refers to three studies that have shown that arrest records are very poor
when there are no policies or laws mandating arrest. Id. at 541-42. These studies found
that when the decision was left to the police the arrest rate ranged between three percent
and ten percent. Id. In one of the studies police made arrests in only thirteen percent of
the cases where the victim had visible injuries and in only fourteen percent of the cases
where the victim requested an arrest. Id. at 542. Another study put the latter figure at
thirty-nine percent. Id. The more fundamental reason for the laws is the tragic numbers of
deaths and injuries to women and children (See, e.g., The American Bar Association
Commission on Domestic Violence, http://www.abanet.org/domviol/stats.html (last visited
Oct. 20, 2005)) (providing statistics of domestic violence on women and children), which
were due in part to the ineffectiveness of prior forms of intervention and to the dismissive
attitudes of the police. Wanless, supra note 21, at 540-42.
22. See Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 125 S.Ct. 2796, 2817 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
23. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.5(3)(a) (2004).
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[a] peace officer shall arrest, or, if an arrest would be
impractical under the circumstances, seek a warrant for the
arrest of a restrained person when the peace officer has
information amounting to probable cause that:
(I) The restrained person has violated or attempted to
violate any provision of a protection order; and
(II) The restrained person has been properly served with a
copy of the protection order or the restrained person has
received actual notice of the existence and substance of such
order.24
The statute not only identifies the police as having a duty to enforce
the protection order, but also identifies the beneficiary of the order.
Subsection (1.5)(a) identifies the "protected person" as "the person or
persons identified in the protection order as the person or persons for
whose benefit the protection order was issued., 25 The order itself repeated
much of the language of the legislation, and identified Ms. Gonzales and
her children as the beneficiaries of the order.
After briefly addressing the "special relationship" created by the
statute and Ms. Gonzales's "new property" right, this section will address
the Court's flawed approach to the case and the Court's flawed arguments
in the case. Had the case of Castle Rock been approached according to
accepted canons of statutory construction and precedent, it either would
have been certified to the Colorado Supreme Court for a determination of
the issue of the state-based right, or it would have been remanded for a
trial on the merits. Furthermore, even if one accepts the Court's approach
to the case, not certifying the question and not deferring to the circuit
court's decision, the Supreme Court's arguments defeating Ms. Gonzales's
claims are seriously flawed. The decision can only be justified by a strong
presumption against the ability of states to create new property rights that
will be protected against arbitrary deprivation under the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process clause.
1. Forging a Special Relationship
In effect, the Colorado General Assembly forged a "special
relationship" between the police and those who have obtained restraining
orders, creating duties on the police to enforce restraining orders, and the
right or entitlement of those who have obtained orders to have them

24. Id. at § 18-6-803.5(3)(b) (emphasis added).
25. Id. at § 18-6-803.5(1.5)(a).
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enforced. This altered the common law distribution of entitlements and
duties. Under the common law, the police have no duty to come to one's
aid unless there is this "special relationship., 26 The public duty rule works
to defeat claims by specific individuals absent a "special relationship"

establishing a specific duty to the plaintiff or her class. 2' Traditionally,
"special relationships" are limited to those cases in which the police have
committed to taking action on behalf of the particular plaintiff, 28 or those
in her class,29 or when a statute imposes a specific duty on the entity for a
particular class of persons. 30 This is what the Colorado legislation did. The

legislation and the court order were designed to make it clear to the police
that in addition to their general public duties that they have specific duties
to a certain class of individuals covered by the legislation, and to the
particular person specified in the court order.3 ' The idea was to forge a

26. See, e.g., Licia A. Esposito Eaton, Annotation, Liability of Municipality or Other
Governmental Unit for Failureto Provide Police Protectionfrom Crime, 90 A.L.R. 5th 273
(2001); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314A, 323 (1965).
27. The public duty doctrine extends to all public entities. Exceptions can be found
when the conduct in question is reckless, intentional or egregious, or when the entity
induces reliance by the plaintiff, stands in a special relationship to either the wrongdoer or
the victim, and when the entity is guilty of a negligent action, rather than a negligent
omission. See DAN DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 271, at 723-27 (2000). Dobbs refers to
recent case law in a few states that have rejected the public duty doctrine, including Alaska,
Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oregon,
and Wisconsin. Id. at 725-26 n.23. In many of these cases the courts noted that the public
duty rule was a form of immunity and thus should not survive when immunity has been
abrogated. Id.
28. "[Wlhen the State, through its agents, voluntarily assumes a protective duty toward a
certain member of the public and undertakes action on behalf of that member, thereby
inducing reliance, it is held to the same standard of care as a private person or
organization." Williams v. State, 664 P.2d 137, 140 (Cal. 1983). See, e.g., Morgan v. County
of Yuba, 41 Cal. Rptr. 508, 508 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964) (where police failed to keep their
voluntary promise to inform plaintiff's wife of the release of a prisoner who had threatened
to kill her and when released did kill her). The rule has been characterized as an
application of the "good Samaritan" rule that attaches once one volunteers to assist. See
Davidson v. City of Westminster, 649 P.2d 894, 900 (Cal. 1982). The argument for holding
the police liable under such conditions is stronger than holding the good Samaritan liable
given that the police have a general duty to the public while the average citizen who
volunteers aid does not.
29. Florence v. Goldberg, 375 N.E.2d 763, 763 (N.Y. 1978) (the police department
voluntarily assumed the specific duty to guard a school crossing and without notice failed in
that duty).
30. DOBBS, supra note 27, at 724.
31. Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1104. The circuit court made the following remark about the
conduct of the police in this case: "Their response... was a sham which rendered her
property interest in the restraining order not only a nullity, but a cruel deception." Id. at
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special relationship with a class of people that the police had wanted to
avoid," thus providing a right to enforcement and bringing an end to an
era of arbitrary enforcement.
2. Ms. Gonzales' Property Right
Last term, the U.S. Supreme Court essentially rewrote the Colorado
law and undid its protections by removing any prospect for a constitutional
remedy for those directly harmed by police officers' arbitrary decision to
violate the law by not enforcing restraining orders. The Supreme Court
ruled that Ms. Gonzales could not state a claim for which relief could be
granted because she had no "property right" to have the court order
enforced, notwithstanding that the legislature had required that such
enforcement was mandatory in all cases. Thus, not only did the police
arbitrarily deny her protection, the Supreme Court denied her the
protection
of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause and §
33
1983.

1117. As noted by the circuit court, the property right held by this particular plaintiff was
not created by the abstract legislative process which brought the legislation into being, but
by the order "issued by a court on behalf of a particular person and directed at specific
individuals and the police." Id. at 1104 n.9.
32. As Heather Melton states, "Historically, police response has been severely limited
and confined to a policy under which officers ended up chronically distancing themselves
from a task they felt did not belong under their jurisdiction." Heather C. Melton, Police
Response to Domestic Violence, 29 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 1, 1 (1999), available at
http://www.crab.rutgers.edu/-goertzel/CJreadings/PoliceDomesticViolence.pdf.
The
reasons for the avoidance include sexist views, the view that these are purely private
matters, the resistance the police encounter from perpetrators and victims, the danger for
the police responding to domestic calls, and the fact that the police they are often illequipped to mediate or counsel perpetrators and victims. See, e.g., Melton, supra, at 3. An
influential study in Minneapolis appeared to advocate that arrests were more effective at
addressing the problem. Melton, supra, at 2. Marion Wanless argues that mandatory arrest
statutes aid the police as they take the domestic violence scenario out of the quasi police
function of mediation and put it squarely into the arrest function, which police are better
trained to perform and more comfortable performing. Wanless, supra note 21, at 547.
33. Note that the quote at the beginning of this article is from the House of
Representative debates over the Civil Rights bill introduced in 1866, passed and vetoed by
President Johnson and then overridden in that same year. See DANIEL A. FARBER &
SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 423-54 (2d ed. 2005).
The Civil Rights Act was the precursor to the Fourteenth Amendment. The argument put
forward by representative Broomall included pointing out that it was "strange" that the
government had the power to protect U.S. citizens abroad, but was powerless to protect
them from the discriminatory denial of rights within the U.S. by the various states. See id at
430-31. If the government is unable or unwilling to protect its citizens, how can it ask for
their allegiance?

2005]

POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY

Although the property right in this case is not the typical right against
the government taking one's land, the distinction between rights and mere
privileges was rejected in Goldberg v. Kelly,3 4 and this was solidified in
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,35 where the Court stated, "the
Court has fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between 'rights'
and 'privileges' that once seemed to govern the applicability of procedural
due process rights. ,36 In Roth the Court stated the requirements for a
property interest are as follows:

To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly
must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He
must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He
must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It
is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect
those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives,
reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined."
In order for someone to have more than a unilateral expectation the
State needs to have created the entitlement, i.e., the existence of an
entitlement is determined by an "independent source such as state law"
and the "rules or understandings" that it creates. 38 The majority in Castle
Rock began its analysis by quoting much of this language from Roth.39
However, it did not spend any time on whether Ms. Gonzales had more

34. 397 U.S. 254, 254 (1970). As Charles R. Reich has commented about the case: "The
question is: how much responsibility should the community take for the protection of the
individual? The community must choose among three responses. It can deny social
responsibility entirely. It can make economic protection of the individual a goal, but
balance this goal against other goals which may be given an equal or higher priority. Or the
community can make individual security an absolute right. Goldberg v. Kelly took the
middle ground. It was a modest, moderate decision giving procedural protection to welfare
recipients." Charles R. Reich, Beyond the New Property: An Ecological view of Due
Process, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 731, 731 (1990).
35. 408 U.S. 564, 564 (1972).
36. Id. at 571.
37. Id. at 577.
38. Id. Charles Reich is generally credited with being the driving intellectual force
behind the assault on the right privilege distinction and for the recognition of "new
property" rights. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 733 (1964).
Reich's list of "new property" includes: income and benefits, jobs, occupational licenses,
franchises, contracts, subsidies, public resources, and services, include postal service, police
and fire services and education among others. Id. at 733-37. The issue of the property right
in question is addressed infra, Part III.
39. Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2803.
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than an abstract need for the enforcement of the restraining order, or if
she relied upon it in her daily life. Rather than address her needs,
expectations and reliance, the Court turned to determine if in fact the
State had created such an entitlement.
However, before doing so, the Court addressed a few preliminary
matters, which if dealt with properly should have resulted in the case either
being remanded for a decision on the merits, or being certified to the
Colorado Supreme Court for a determination on the issue of the statebased property right. This did not take place. The Court refused to certify
the question to the Colorado Supreme Court so it could decide whether its
"mandatory arrest" statute, along with the court order, created the state
right or entitlement in issue and it refused to defer to the decision of the
six judge panel of the Tenth Circuit,• although
deference is the general rule
40
in cases involving state law questions.
B. The Court'sApproach to the Case
Although the Supreme Court determined that the central question in
this case was the state law question regarding the establishment of an
entitlement in favor of Ms. Gonzales,4 1 the majority of the Supreme Court
did not find it prudent to certify the question to the Colorado Supreme
Court. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, put forth a strong array of arguments
in favor of sua sponte certification of the question, including "federal-state
comity, constitutional avoidance, judicial efficiency, the desire to settle
correctly a recurring issue of state law., 42 However, the Court rejected the
idea that it should certify the case on the basis that the parties did not
desire to have the question certified.43
Even if the Court did not find Justice Stevens's arguments persuasive,
it still would have been the practice to defer to the circuit court's
determination as to the matter of state law, absent a finding that the
decision was "clearly wrong." 44 The reasons for the rule of deference are

40. See infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
41. There can be little doubt that Justice Scalia had the federal issue in mind throughout
his opinion. This is revealed in language towards the end of his decision, where he stated
that "[tlhis result reflects our continuing reluctance to treat the Fourteenth Amendment as
,a font of tort law."' Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2810 (citations omitted) (Indicating Scalia's
hostility to the § 1983 legislation, which explicitly makes violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment a font for tort law) (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
42. Id. at 2816 n.6 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see also id. at 2815-16.
43. Id. at 2804 n.5.
44. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 501 n.9 (1985). The court in Brockett
also stated: "The Court has stated that it will defer to lower courts on state-law issues unless
there is 'plain' error[;] ... the view of the lower court is 'clearly wrong,' ... or the
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based on both efficiency and local knowledge of law and practice.
In
response to Respondent's contention that the Supreme Court was obliged
to give deference to the circuit court, Justice Scalia dismissively addressed
the matter by stating, "[w]e will not, of course, defer to the Tenth Circuit
on the ultimate issue. 46 His minimal justification is stated as follows:
We have said that a "presumption of deference [is] given
the views of a federal court as to the law of a State within its
jurisdiction .... "
That presumption can be overcome,
however.., and we think deference inappropriate here.
The Tenth Circuit's opinion... did not draw upon a deep
well of state-specific expertise, but consisted primarily of
quoting language from the restraining order,
• 41 the statutory
text, and a state-legislative hearing transcript.
This brief justification and the authority cited does not help the Court's
case, as the per curiam decision in Leavitt was based on the finding that the
circuit court was clearly wrong in failing to give effect to the plain language
of the statute. 8 Thus, while it is true that the presumption can be
overcome, it is only when the circuit court is clearly wrong. As with the
legislative history of the statute, the Court cannot find any support for the
view that there is a more permissive standard than the "clearly wrong"
standard. Further, the Court does not attempt to argue that the circuit
court was clearly wrong, but merely states that "we think deference

construction is 'clearly erroneous,'.. . or 'unreasonable[.]' On occasion, then, the Court
has refused to follow the views of a lower federal court on an issue of state law. In Cole v.
Richardson... we refused to accept a three-judge District Court's construction of a single
statutory word based on the dictionary definition of that language where more reliable
indicia of the legislative intent were available." Id. (citations omitted).
45. Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2814 (2005). As Justice
Stevens states: that "[t]his policy is not only efficient, but it reflects "our belief that district
courts and courts of appeal[s] are better schooled in and more able to interpret the laws of
their respective States." Id. (dissenting) (parallel citations omitted).
46. Id. at 2803.
47. Id. at 2804 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
48. As the Court stated, "[t]he Court of Appeals' opinion not only did not regard the
explicit language of § 317 as determinative - it did not even use it as the point of departure
for addressing the severability question." Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 140 (1996) (per
curiam). The Court went on to state, as referenced in Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. 2804 by
Justice Scalia, that the "generalpresumption [of deference] is obviously inapplicablewhere
the court of appeals' state-law ruling is plainly wrong, a conclusion that the dissent does not
even contest in this case." Id. at 145 (emphasis added). In Castle Rock, it is Justice Scalia
who is ignoring the explicit language of the statute, not the circuit court.
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inappropriate here."49 Thus, the Court has both distorted the rule and
misapplied it to the facts of the present case.
C. The Supreme Court's Substantive Arguments Designed to Defeat the
Claim to a Property Right
Having thus strained to bring the matter under its purview, the
Supreme Court turned its attention to systematically undermine the claim
that Ms. Gonzales had a property entitlement in the enforcement of the
restraining order. The Court had a series of arguments against the claim,
including: (1) the alleged mandatory arrest statute is not mandatory
because it still allows for police discretion, and thus there is no entitlement
to enforcement; ° (2) even if the statute was mandatory, it mandates that
one either arrest or seek an arrest warrant, and since seeking an arrest
warrant •51
is a procedure and not an end in itself, this cannot give rise to an
entitlement; (3) even if the statute mandated a non-discretionary duty on
the part of the police, it would still not follow that the intention was to
provide the plaintiff with a right or entitlement, rather than simply
fulfilling a public end; 52 and (4) even if it did establish an entitlement, it is
not a property entitlement protected by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because it does not have monetary value and was
an incidental benefit of a general duty. 3
In the remainder of this section, it is argued that the plain language,
history, and purpose of the legislation all indicate that the statute
mandates enforcement, and while there may be some amount of
discretion, it is not the sort that undermines the duty of enforcement. The
options to arrest, or seek an arrest warrant are not discretionary options,
and they are not merely procedures, but are ends that give rise to an
entitlement. The statute serves both public and private ends, and the
history of the legislation and other similar legislation indicates that that the
intention was to create a right or entitlement in the mandatory
enforcement. Because the entitlement was created by the democratically
elected and accountable representatives of the people of Colorado,
because it does have monetary value, and because it is central to the
purpose of the legislation, it is not appropriate for the Supreme Court to
49. See Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2804 (2005).
50. As will be demonstrated below, it is unclear if the Court is holding that no
mandatory arrest statute can really be mandatory, or if it is holding merely that this
statute's language fails to be clearly mandatory. Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2806-07.
51. Justices Souter and Breyer rest their concurring opinion on this argument. Id. at
2807-08.
52. Id.at 2808-09.
53. Id. at 2809-10.
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unilaterally diminish this entitlement to something unworthy of due
process protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
1. Duty versus Discretion
The first set of arguments by the Supreme Court to justify its decision
rests on the claim that the purported mandatory arrest statute is not
mandatory because it allows for discretion. 4 According to the Court,
"[o]ur cases recognize that a benefit is not a protected entitlement if
government officials may grant or deny it in their discretion. 5 5 The Court
arrived at its determination that the statute allowed for discretion by
ignoring the plain language of the statute, 56 and the restraining order, as
well as ignoring the legislative history of the particular statute and similar
statutes addressing the same issue.
The circuit court decision was based on both the plain meaning the
statute and of the court order that was issued to Ms. Gonzales, because it
was "issued by a court on behalf of a particular person and directed at
specific individuals and the police. 5 7 The circuit court pointed to the
specific language of the court order in this case:
[y]ou shall use every reasonable means to enforce this
restraining order." It further dictated that an officer shall
arrest, or, if an arrest would be impractical under the
circumstances, seek a warrant for the arrest of the
restrained person when you have information amounting to
probable cause that the restrained person has violated or
attempted to violate any provision of this order and the

54. Id. at 2803.
55. Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2803 (2005) (citing
Kentucky Dept. of Correctionsv. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1989)).
56. Justice Scalia is known for his textualist approach to interpretation, which in his
hands is in keeping with a conservative approach to entitlements. As will be demonstrated
infra, in Castle Rock, Justice Scalia and the majority avoid the textualist approach here
because it would require the recognition of new entitlements. As stated by Bradford C.
Mank; "Justice Scalia and other modern textualists often use "clear-statement canons" that
require express congressional authorization for a particular type of government regulatory
action; this results in narrow constructions of a statute. Clear-statement principles are
specific applications of the common law's traditional presumption in favor of narrowly
construing statutes that arguably change the law[.] Most scholars believe that clearstatement principles generally tend to narrow the scope of statutory language." Bradford.
C. Mank, Textualism's Selective Canons of Statutory Construction:ReinvigoratingIndividual
Liberties, Legislative Authority, and Deference to Executive Agencies, 86 Ky. L.J. 527, 551
(1997-98).
57. Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1104 n.9.
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restrained person has been properly served with a copy of
this order or has received actual notice of the existence of
this order.8
This mirrors the language of the statute quoted at the beginning of this
section. While the repeated use of the word "shall" is not the same as the
word "mandatory," few words have a clearer statutory meaning. 59 "You6
verb. 0
shall" means that you have a duty to do that which follows the
Based on a plain meaning reading of the statute, it is hard to explain any
other meaning "shall" could have, given that the neighboring provisions
use the word "may." 61 The majority of the Court reads them to mean the

same
thing, but doing so violates a basic canon of statutory construction. 62
It effectively voids the word "shall" in the text, rendering it superfluous.63

58. Id. at 1103-04 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Ms. Gonzales'
restraining order dated May 12, 1999).
59. DiMarco v. Dep't of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Div., 857 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1993). "The factor which most heavily weighs in favor of a mandatory construction is
the use of the word 'shall' in the provision at issue. Unless the context indicates otherwise,
the word 'shall' generally indicates that the General Assembly intended the provision to be
mandatory." Id. (citing People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918 (Colo. 1986)).
60. Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004), reads: "shall, vb. 1. Has a duty to; more
broadly, is required to <the requester shall send notice> <notice shall be sent>. - This is the
mandatory sense that drafters typically intend and that courts typically uphold .... 2.
Should (as often interpreted by courts) <all claimants shall request mediation>. 3. May <no
person shall enter the building without first signing the roster>. * When a negative word
such as not or no precedes shall (as in the example in angle brackets), the word shall often
means may. What is being negated is permission, not a requirement. 4. Will (as a futuretense verb) <the corporation shall then have a period of 30 days to object>. 5. Is entitled to
<the secretary shall be reimbursed for all expenses>. - Only sense 1 is acceptable under
strict standardsof drafting." (emphasis added).
61. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18 (West 2005). For instance, "Such peace officer may
transport, or obtain transportation for, the alleged victim to shelter." Id at § 18-6803.5(6)(a) (emphasis added).
62. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 19 (2001). As the Court stated in TRWInc., "[i]t
is 'a cardinal principle of statutory construction' that 'a statute ought, upon the whole, to be
so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous,
void, or insignificant."' TRW Inc., 534 U.S. at 31 (2001) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533
U.S. 167, 174 (2001)). Colorado Revised Statutes section 2-4-201 (Intentions in the
enactment of statutes) states, "(1) In enacting a statute, it is presumed that: ... (b) The
entire statute is intended to be effective." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2-4-201 (West 2005).
63. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2-4-101 (West 2005). Although ignored by the Court,
Colorado legislation provides guidance as to how its provisions should be read. Colorado
Revised Statutes section 2-4-101 (Common and technical usage) reads in part, "Words and
phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and
common usage." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2-4-101 (West 2005). "When the language of a
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The Court counters the plain meaning reading with what it refers to as
the "well established" tradition of discretion that has coexisted with other
mandatory arrest statutes in the past. 64 The Court relies on its tradition in
this area, or the status quo, and although it appears to cite authority for its
view, none of the authority is relevant to mandatory arrest statutes in the
specific context of restraining or protection order violations. The Court
refers to the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 65 and Chicago v.
Morales66 to support the argument that legislative history 67 and precedent
show that there is still discretion under mandatory arrest statutes.
However, the ABA standards are not addressed to the legislative history
of this particular statute, or to any other statute passed to mandate arrest
in the restraining order context. Further, the Court in Morales found that
there was still discretion, because the statute was unconstitutionally vague

statute is plain and its meaning is clear, the court must interpret it as written." Interest of
A.R.W., 903 P.2d 10, 14 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Hohn v. Morrison, 870 P.2d 513 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1993)).
64. Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 125 S.Ct. 2796, 2805-06 (2005).
65. Id. at 2806. Justice Scalia quotes from the commentary to the ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice for this view, but the language he quotes does not further the view. The
reasons he gives for why "mandatory arrest statutes" do not mean "mandatory" include
"legislative history, insufficient resources, and sheer physical impossibility." Id. (quoting 1
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 1-4.5, commentary, pp. 1-124 to 1-125 (2d ed. 1980)
(footnotes omitted)). The problem is that the ABA standards are not referring to
mandatory arrest for the violation of restraining orders, so the legislative history is off
point; the reasons of "insufficient resources" or "sheer impossibility" do not turn a
mandatory requirement into a discretionary choice. They may justify why the police are
unable to immediately arrest someone or obtain a warrant in a given context, but they do
not defeat the duty. Colorado Revised Statutes section 2-4-201 (Intentions in the enactment
of statutes) states, "(1) In enacting a statute, it is presumed that: ...(d) A result feasible of
execution is intended." COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 2-4-201 (West 2005). There is no
evidence that it was infeasible or impossible to carry out the duties in this case.
66. 527 U.S. 41, 41 (1999).
67. Antonin Scalia, Supreme Court Justice, Address at Princeton University: CommonLaw Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in
Interpreting
the
Constitution
and
Laws
(Mar.
8,
1995),
available at
http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/scalia97.pdf.
In his scholarly work, Justice
Scalia rejects the use of legislative history as a means of determining the meaning of a
statute, when he states, "My view that the objective indication of the words, rather than the
intent of the legislature, is what constitutes the law leads me, of course, to the conclusion
that legislative history should not be used as an authoritative indication of the meaning of a
statute." Id. at 104. Justice Scalia further states that "it is simply incompatible with
democratic government - or indeed, even with fair government - to have the meaning of a
law determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather than by what the lawgiver
promulgated." Id. at 92. Is it more democratic to determine the meaning according to what
the Court thinks the words mean, rather than their plain meaning?
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in specifying the conditions under which an arrest was to be made, not
because the arrest was mandatory. 68
The legislative history of the Colorado legislation 69 and legislation of

its type (mandatory arrest statutes in the restraining or protection order
context) reinforce the "mandatory" reading of the legislation. 0 The
majority of the Court cannot point to any evidence that the drafters of the
Colorado statute meant "may" when they used the term "shall."

Thus,

from the beginning of the judgment, the Court is stretching to justify its
interpretation of the text in order to deny the right. The Court stretches

68. Morales, 527 U.S. at 41.
69. Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2805 (2005). Scalia notes
that the Court of Appeals quoted a lawmaker's description of how the bill would really
attack the domestic violence problems: "[T]he entire criminal justice system must act in a
consistent manner, which does not now occur. The police must make probable cause
arrests. The prosecutors must prosecute every case. Judges must apply appropriate
sentences, and probation officers must monitor their probationers closely. And the
offender needs to be sentenced to offender-specific therapy. '[T]he entire system must
send the same message ... [that] violence is criminal. And so we hope that House Bill 1253
starts us down this road."' 366 F.3d, at 1107 (quoting Tr. of Colorado House Judiciary
Hearings on House Bill 1253, Feb. 15, 1994) (emphases omitted). Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at
2805 n.6 (internal quotations omitted). He does not refer to any contrary authority
regarding the legislative history of this statute, or any authority regarding the host of
mandatory arrest statutes in the restraining order or protection order context. Similarly the
petitioner could not refer to any evidence of contrary intent with regard to mandatory
arrest statutes in the context of restraining or protection orders. See Reply Brief of
Petitioner, Castle Rock v. Gonzales, (2005) (No. 04-278). The Reply Brief, like Justice
Scalia's opinion, addresses other types of mandatory arrest statutes. See id.
70. Nearing v. Weaver, 670 P.2d 137 (Or. 1983). The court in Nearing addressed the
history behind similar Oregon legislation when it stated ORS 133.310(3) prescribes that:
"A peace officer shall arrest and take into custody a person without a warrant when the
peace officer has probable cause to believe that:
(a) There exists an order ... restraining the person; and
(b) A true copy of the order and proof of service on the person has been filed as required in
ORS 107.720; and
(c) The peace officer has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has
violated the terms of that order." Nearing, 670 P.2d at 139 n.1.
"The widespread refusal or failure of police officers to remove persons involved in episodes
of domestic violence was presented to the legislature as the main reason for tightening the
law so as to require enforcement of restraining orders by mandatory arrest and custody."
Id. at 142. The court also noted that, like the provisions of the Colorado statute,
"Subsection (3) appears after two subsections that state when an officer 'may' arrest a
person without a warrant, and the contrasting use of 'shall' in subsection (3) is no accident."
Id. In light of the public nature of the litigation in Castle Rock, it is hard to imagine that the
drafters of the Colorado statute were ignorant of how the language they chose would be
interpreted by the courts.
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further when it turns to Chicago v. Morales for the proposition that it is
impossible to create a true mandatory arrest statute. The Court in
Gonzales stated it is "common sense that all police officers must use some
discretion in deciding when and where to enforce city ordinances."'] The
majority in Gonzales tempers this in the very next sentence, which states:
"a true mandate of police action would require some stronger indication
from the Colorado Legislature than 'shall use every reasonable means to
enforce a restraining order' (or even 'shall arrest... or ... seek a
warrant'), §§ 18-6-803.5(3)(a), (b)."72
If this last sentence is the holding, then clearer language may convince
some members of the Court that the state intended to create a mandatory
right of enforcement, but as noted above, it is hard to imagine clearer
language that is not silly (e.g. "really shall", "must use all means regardless
of how reasonable"). However, if the prior sentence is the holding, it is
not humanly possible to squeeze out all of the discretion, no matter how
strong the language is. As long as the statute is directed at people who
carry out a function, there will always be discretion as to exactly when or
how a person will carry out that function." If this is the standard for an
entitlement claim, then this would defeat almost every entitlement claim
that has arisen, whether it is health care, as pointed out by Justice
Stevens,74 or any number of other entitlements that the courts have found
to give rise to due process protection,75 for they all involve some level of
discretion in implementation.

71. Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2806 (quoting Morales, 527 U.S. at 62 n.32) (emphasis in
Castle Rock).
72. Id.
73. Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1105-06. This is why it is common for the courts to distinguish
between different types of discretion. As the circuit court noted: "In Allen, the Supreme
Court noted one could use the term 'discretion' in two distinct ways. In one sense of the
word, an official has discretion when he or she 'is simply not bound by standards set by the
authority in question."' Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 375, 107 S. Ct. 2415 (citing R. DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 32 (1977)). In the alternative, "the term discretion may instead
signify that 'an official must use judgment in applying the standards set him [or her] by
authority."' Id. (citing DWORKIN, supra at 31, 32). See also Watson v. City of Kansas City,
857 F.2d 690, 695 (10th Cir.1988), Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1105-06. At best the discretion
here is how to carry out the policy or instructions set down for the officer, not the discretion
to ignore the policy or to set new policy.
74. Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2820 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. See E.g. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602-03 (1972) (continued public
employment); See also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (free education); Sniadach
v. Family Finance Corp, 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969) (garnished wages); Barry v. Barchi, 443
U.S. 55, 64 (1979) (professional licenses); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (drivers'
licenses); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982) (causes of action);
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Assuming that a majority of the Supreme Court would not be inclined
to deny all of these entitlements, the question shifts back to what level of

discretion is appropriate. This may depend on the nature of the endeavor,
because some endeavors require less judgment or discretion. In the case of
police enforcement, it would not be wise for the State to require, no matter
what the conditions are, an officer to drop everything immediately and
arrest or hunt down someone when there is cause to suspect that a
restraining order has been violated. This could lead to absurd results; the

officer may be in the middle of trying to arrest someone who is on a
shooting spree. Nonetheless, if the police have been routinely ignoring
their duty to enforce restraining orders, resulting in serious harm to certain
groups of people in the community, the State may wish to put an end to
this practice by making enforcement mandatory. It is reasonable, given
the conditions, that it should choose language appropriate to the task. The
use of "shall use every reasonable means to enforce a protection order"
along with "shall arrest, or,.. . seek a warrant '7 6 as found in the Colorado

legislation, appears appropriate to this end. It makes enforcement
mandatory within reason. The appropriateness of this language is
bolstered by the fact that other states have used similar language in their

statutes and courts have found these statutes to give rise to a right or
entitlement to enforcement. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, refers to four
cases from four different states that have interpreted their mandatory

arrest statutes to mean what they say, i.e. that an arrest is mandatory.77
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1978) (the receipt of
government services, including utility services); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332
(1976) (disability benefits); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (welfare benefits).
76. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-6-803.5(3)(a), (b) (West 2004).
77. Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 125 S.Ct. at 2796, 2818-19 (2005) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (citing Nearing v. Weaver, 670 P.2d. 137 (Or. 1983); Matthews v. Pickett
County, 996 S.W.2d 162, 162 (Tenn. 1999); Campbell v. Campbell, 682 A.2d 272 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1996); Donaldson v. City of Seattle, 831 P.2d 1098 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). The
relevant parts of these decisions relied on, respectively: OR. REV. STAT. § 133.310(3) (1977)
(stating "defendant shall be arrested"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-611(a) (1987); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:25-31 (2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.31.100(2) (2005). Oregon, in 1977,
was the first state to enact mandatory arrest laws in domestic violence cases. Joan Zorza,
The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 46, 63 (1992).
Note that Oregon's mandatory arrest statute did not
immediately result in more arrests by the police. As is pointed out by both Ruth Gundle in
Civil Liability for Police Failureto Arrest: Nearing v. Weaver, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 259,
262 (1986) [hereinafter Gundle], and Sue Ellen Schuerman in Establishinga Tort Duty for
Police Failure to Respond to Domestic Violence, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 355 n.38, n.117 (1992)
[hereinafter Schuerman], the arrest rates remained low (citing a 1979 study by the Oregon
Governor's Commission for Women). This prompted the litigation by the Oregon
Coalition Against Domestic and Sexual Violence on behalf of Ms. Nearing in the hopes
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The majority largely ignores these decisions and the statutes that they are
based on. Justice Stevens connects these cases together with the Colorado
statute and a whole wave of statutes throughout the country that were
enacted for the purpose of removing or limiting the discretion of the police
to enforce protection or restraining orders."' None of the statutes has
"more mandatory" language; they all use the similar language of "shall
have chosen
arrest." Some states use the term "may," and Colorado could
79
this language had it wished enforcement to be discretionary.
As these cases and legislation demonstrate, it was reasonable for
Colorado to adopt the language that it did in order to make enforcement
of restraining orders mandatory. In fact, Colorado had the advantage of
both the existing Oregon legislation and case law interpreting the language
to mean mandatory. The majority does not point to a single case in which
the courts have interpreted a statute purporting to mandate arrest for the
violation of a restraining order as non-mandatory.
As a final point, the discretion that is allowed by these types of
legislation is operational in nature. It involves some amount of discretion
as to how to carry out a function or policy. As argued above, this is
impossible to avoid. However, this type of discretion is completely
different from the type of discretion that is generally relied upon to
immunize the state or defeat claims to relief, namely the discretion to
80
either set, ignore or change the underlying policy in question.
that a successful tort action would force compliance with the law. See Gundle, at 262 and
Schuerman, at 369 n.117). Schuerman also notes a similar problem in compliance following
the enactment of legislation in Minnesota. Schuerman at 360 n.38.
78. CastleRock, 125 S. Ct. at 2818 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. For example, Montana legislation uses "may," MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-311(1)
(2005), and states that "[a]rrest is the preferred response." MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6311(2)(a) (2005).
80. Interpreting similar legislation to that in Colorado, the court held in Matthews v.
Pickett County, 996 S.W.2d 162, 162 (Tenn. 1999), "[t]he record supports a finding that the
deputies' failure to arrest Winningham was a deviation from a policy as expressed by
statutory mandate and was operational in nature." Id. at 164. It is common for immunity
statutes to recognize this distinction, providing immunity for policy decisions, but not for
implementation decisions. See 57 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal, County, School, and State Tort
Liability § 78 (2001). "In administering the test distinguishing between discretionary acts
and ministerial functions, the key factor is the presence of basic policy formulation,
planning or policy decisions, which are characterized by an exercise of a high degree of
official judgment or discretion, because most states' laws provide for immunity if the
government was acting in that manner at the time of the injury." Id. In fact the distinction
goes as far back as Marbury v. Madison, in which Justice Marshall distinguished between
cases in which an official has political or legal discretion as to what policy to follow or
create, and those in which the law assigns a specific duty. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803).
In the former case it was held to be clear that the official could only be held accountable to

TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.

[Vol. 13:1

Thus, the generally accepted approach to issues of discretion, as well
as the plain language, history, and purpose of the legislation, all lead to the
conclusion in Castle Rock that the police did not have the relevant kind of
discretion required to defeat an entitlement claim. For the Court to find
that the police did have that discretion is to effectively ignore Colorado's
legislation, and to find as a matter of constitutional law that the police
have discretion to arbitrarily ignore restraining orders. It gives police
departments and officers the discretion to set policy, including the
discretion to adopt a policy of arbitrary non enforcement, notwithstanding
the fact that this is completely contrary to the policy set by the legislature
and embodied in a court order issued by the courts. This renders the
legislation and the court order a sham and a nullity, and undermines the
democratic and judicial processes that resulted in the court order.
2. Rights versus procedure
The majority's second set of arguments is that even if the statute was
mandatory it mandates one of two options, arrest or seek an arrest
warrant. Since the second option•81
is a procedure, and not an end in itself,
this cannot give rise to an entitlement. This comes close to replicating the
duty-discretion distinction above and is questionable on this basis.
Nonetheless, even if the argument did have merit, it misses the point.
The mere fact that the police have an option does not mean that the
police can choose to do nothing, or that they have a free hand in choosing
among options. Under the Colorado statute, the choice between the two
options is not discretionary, as the officer is only permitted to seek an
arrest warrant if an arrest is impractical. 82 There was no evidence of such
impracticality in the Castle Rock case. Thus, even if one accepts the
majority's argument that the second option is no more than an entitlement
to a procedure, which the Supreme Court has held is not enough for the

the political process, while in the latter the Court held "it [seems] equally clear that the
individual who [considers himself] injured, has a right to [resort] to the laws of his country
for a remedy." Id.
81. Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2807-08. Justices Souter
and Breyer, in their concurring opinion, rest on this argument. Id.
82. The option is an improvement on those statutes that merely make the arrest
mandatory, for if the arrest is impractical it simply will not be done, mandatory language or
not. Those statutes that do not fill the gap by requiring that the officer seek an arrest
warrant actually provide more discretion to the police officer to do nothing in the face of
the impracticality of arrest. Thus, it makes perfect sense to require that the officer seek a
warrant as a means of enforcing the order under such circumstances. It gives further clarity
and direction to an officer who is to "use every reasonable means to enforce a protection
order." COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-6-803.5(3)(a) (2005).
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• 81
attachment of a due process right,
that point could only be reached if the
respondent succeeded on the merits as to the first requirement. This is
highly questionable given the facts as alleged. It may be the case that the
respondent would prevail on this issue, but that is a question of fact, which
could only be reached by allowing this case to go to the merits stage. In
other words, this is not a ground for dismissing the case.

3. Private right versus public purpose
The Court's third set of arguments is that even if the statute mandated
a non-discretionary duty on the part of the police, it would still not follow
that the intention was to provide the plaintiff a right or entitlement, rather
than simply fulfilling a public end, as does much of the criminal law.8 At
first glance, the Court's third set of arguments appears to be the most
compelling. We are very comfortable with the distinction between
criminal law and civil law, with the former serving public ends and the
latter serving private ends.8 As the majority states, "serving of public
rather than private ends is the normal course of the criminal law., 86 Thus,
it is plausible to contend that a statute placing duties on the police to
enforce the law are designed to serve public ends, rather than private
ends. 87
However, the two are not mutually exclusive. There is no question
that the Colorado statute was designed to serve public ends. It does not
follow, however, that it was not also designed to serve private ends, or that

83. As the Court stated: "The problem with this is that the seeking of an arrest warrant
would be an entitlement to nothing but procedure - which we have held inadequate even to
support standing.., much less can it be the basis for a property interest." Castle Rock, 125
S. Ct. at 2808 (citation omitted). See also Another Case in Lochner's Legacy, supra note 14
(arguing that the duty to seek an arrest warrant is not a mere procedure).
84. Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2808-09.
85. Justice Scalia reaches back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to support this
view. Id. at 2808 (citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 5
(1769) and Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 668 (1892)).
86. Castle Rock, 125 S.Ct. at 2808.
87. Although not recognized by Justice Scalia, his argument is superficially bolstered by
the Colorado Revised Statutes, which state "[i]n enacting a statute, it is presumed that ...
[p]ublic interest is favored over any private interest." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 2-4-201(1)(e)
(2000). This in no way defeats the private interest when it is compatible with the public
interest. Further, "[wihere the meaning is clear and no injustice would result, the statute
must be interpreted as written without resort to other rules of statutory construction." In
Interest of R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 29 (Colo. 1989) (citing People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918,
921 (Colo. 1986)).
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it helped to serve the public end by giving a private entitlement. 8 This is
not general legislation calling on the police to carry out their functions
generally, but is legislation designed to protect a particular class of
vulnerable people. The legislation sought to accomplish the goal by both
shifting intervention in this area from mediation and counseling to arrests,
and by making enforcement of restraining orders mandatory.89 The
Colorado legislation came with a wave of similar legislation across the
country that was the result of the victims, survivors, and their advocacy
groups pushing for these rights and duties. 9° They even took part in the
drafting, as G. Kristian Miccio points out:
In... Colorado, advocates were approached by key
legislators to incorporate mandatory state intervention into
arrest provisions. This was the culmination of years of
working within the law enforcement establishment as
advocates attempted to change police practices through the
institution of pro-arrest policies as the preferred course of
action. 91
Finally, given that advocacy groups were involved in the drafting of
the legislation, it is a stretch to think that the drafters of the legislation
were not aware of the Oregon legislation and the Nearing case holding that
its provisions did give rise to an entitlement to enforcement. 92
4. Still not a property right?

88. Both our common law and statutory law regularly serve public ends by providing
private rights of action. Punitive damages are the clearest common law example while the §
1983 legislation provides a right to sue for "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (2005).
89. See Wanless, supra note 21.
90. See Miccio, supra note 20 at 248-82 (2005) (tracing the histories of both the battered
women's movement, as well as the mandatory arrest movement). See also Wanless, supra
note 21, at 539-40.
91. Miccio, supra note 20, at 279 (citation omitted) (referring to Miccio's interviews with
advocates in Colorado in 2003).
92. The plaintiff in Nearing sued under the Oregon Tort Claims Act. As the court held,
"[ilf a private defendant would be liable for harm caused by failure to carry out a
mandatory duty for the benefit of a specific person protected by a court order... the Tort
Claims Act makes a public defendant liable in the same manner." 670 P.2d at 144. As
noted, this case was brought under § 1983 based on the alleged due process violation of the
state entitlement. It also may have been brought under Colorado state law as Colorado
allows for suits against public employees for injuries caused by willful and wanton conduct.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-10-118 (1992). The facts alleged arguably satisfy the
requirement.
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Despite all of the considerations above, the majority of the Court still
maintained that even if this was an entitlement, it was not a property
interest under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause because
the Court did not think it resembled traditional conceptions of property. 93
It did not have monetary value, and according to the Court, "the alleged
property interest here arises incidentally, not out of some new species of
government benefit or service, but out of a function that government
actors have always performed-to wit, arresting people who they have
probable cause to believe have committed a criminal offense." 94
This last set of arguments is perhaps the least convincing of all. Roth
changed the focus from traditional wooden and naive notions of property
to a view of property rights and entitlement that looked to the function of
property. By looking at the function of property from the past to the
present, the Court was able to formulate the rule that, "[it is a purpose of
the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which
people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily
undermined." 95 Entitlements to mandatory arrest for the violation of
restraining orders are not novel; they have been around since 1977 - nearly
thirty years - and the Oregon statute, upon which the Colorado statute was
modeled, was interpreted to create a new property-like entitlement in
1983, over twenty years ago.
Contrary to the view put forth in the majority opinion, what has not
been happening "all along" is police enforcement of restraining orders. If
the police had in fact been arresting people all along for these violations
there would not have been a need for (what is now) a majority of the states
in the United States to pass legislation mandating arrest for the violation
of restraining orders. It is precisely a "new species of government benefit
or service" 96 that was created by the legislation, rather than an incidental
benefit gained by a general mandate of the police to enforce the law. That
benefit was further narrowed to the specific protected person named in the
restraining order issued by the court. As Justice Stevens
states, "[a]
97
statute."
the
pervades
person'
'protected
the
for
concern
The assertion that a right to the mandatory enforcement of the
restraining order had no monetary value is an odd claim in today's world,
where private security companies, private investigators, and bounty

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Scalia acknowledges that this is no bar to the claim. Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2809.
Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2809.
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2809.
Id. at 2821 n.15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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hunters routinely conduct police functions for money. 9' The argument
against Justice Steven's claim that one could have a contract for such
services furthers the point that the order had monetary value, rather than
detracting from the point. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, responded
in a note that "[a] private person would not have the power to arrest under
those circumstances because the crime would not have occurred in his
presence ... [a]nd, needless to say, a private person would not have the
power to obtain an arrest warrant." 99 First, a private person would have
had the power to arrest since the continued abduction of the children was a
continuing breach of the terms of the restraining order.1°° Secondly, it does
not follow that there is no monetary value that can be placed on the
enforcement of the order simply because a private person does not have
the power to obtain an arrest warrant. It means that the entitlement given
is worth more than what one can buy in the market. In the present case, it
would not necessarily have been worth much more, since a citizen's arrest
could have been made. In those cases in which a citizen's arrest cannot be
made, due to the fact that the violation of the order is not ongoing, the
warrant is worth considerably more since it puts more resources towards
fulfillment of the requirement and substantially increases protection and
the likelihood of an arrest. If these services were available in the market,
one would pay more for them than what one can currently purchase from
the private sector under the law. Thus, the Court's conclusion here appears
to be more of a value judgment about what rights one should be able to
obtain rather than whether or not the state legislature created those rights.
D. Conclusions Regarding Castle Rock
The Court ends its opinion by stating that:
In light of today's decision and that in DeShaney, the
benefit that a third party may receive from having someone
else arrested for a crime generally does not trigger

98. One wonders if Justice Scalia and the rest of the majority think that the protection
given by the U.S. Marshals to members of the judiciary is without monetary value. The
U.S. Marshals website boasts that it "coordinated and provided 187 instances of personal
protective services to U.S. Supreme Court justices" in 2004. United States Marshals
Service, Judicial and Court Security, at http://www.usmarshals.gov/judicial/ (last visited
Aug. 30, 2005).
99. Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2809 n.12 (citations
omitted).
100. See Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093 (10th Cir. 2004). The restraining
order required that the husband not "'molest or disturb the peace' of Ms. Gonzales and
the children. Id. at 1103.
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protections under the Due Process Clause, neither in its
procedural nor in its "substantive" manifestations. This
result reflects our continuing reluctance to treat the
Fourteenth Amendment as " 'a font of tort law, '"... but it
does not mean States are powerless to provide victims with
personally enforceable remedies. Although the framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of
1871, 17 Stat. 13 (the original source of § 1983), did not
create a system by which police departments are generally
held financially accountable for crimes that better policing
might have prevented, the people of Colorado are free to
craft such a system under state law.m l

This appears to say that states can only make state enforceable rights
of this nature, but not property rights or entitlements that are worthy of
Fourteenth Amendment due process protection. This runs contrary to
both the Fourteenth Amendment and the § 1983 legislation. It is
irrelevant that the framers of these two provisions did not "create a system
by which police departments are generally held financially accountable for
crimes that better policing might have prevented."1 0 They created a
mechanism for holding accountable those acting under color of state
authority for the deprivation of a right or privilege, namely the right to
simple due process. The due process right attaches to the right or
entitlement to property.
At the beginning of its opinion the Court stated, "[s]uch entitlements
are 'of course,.., not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law."'
Thus, while the majority begins its judgment with the view that it
is for states to determine the rights that are to be protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, by the end of the judgment it takes that
determination into its own hands and decides that an entitlement to a
mandatory arrest is not good enough to be counted as a property right and
afforded Fourteenth Amendment protection.1
The Court has taken it
upon itself to decide what the Fourteenth Amendment means by
"property" by rewriting a statute designed to make enforcement of
restraining orders mandatory for the health and welfare of "protected

101.
102.
103.
104.

Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2810 n. 12 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 2803 (citations omitted).
See generally id.
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persons" holding those orders. By writing in "may"to a statute that stated
"shall," the Court has chosen the liberty of police officers to arbitrarily
ignore their duties to enforce court ordered restraining orders over the
safety and security of the victims of domestic violence.
Rather than back up the decision of the Colorado General Assembly
to foster the accountability of the police force and to protect some of the
most vulnerable members of its society, the Supreme Court has
undermined the accountability and protections it could have afforded. It
has told these citizens that they do not deserve even the most modest of all
protections, the procedural due process protection against arbitrary
governmental conduct.

III.

CARMICHELE

A. Introduction
Since the beginning of South Africa's constitutional dispensation
there have been a number of cases in which the courts have drawn on the
Constitution and its values to inform the development of the common law
in order
hold105the police accountable for safeguarding the people within
• •to
. ..
its jurisdiction.
These decisions are part of a shift in values from an

105. Dersley v. Minister van Veiligheid en Sekuriteit 2000 (1) All SA 484 (T) (S. Afr.)
(using the Police Service Act 68 of 1995 and the Constitution as factors in determining that
the police owed the plaintiff a legal duty of care in a case involving the negligent
misrepresentation by the police that a given car was not a stolen car vehicle, resulting in the
plaintiff purchasing the vehicle and the police subsequently confiscating the vehicle from
the plaintiff as stolen property); Van Duivenboden v. Minister of Safety and Sec. 2001 (4)
All SA 127 (CC) (S. Afr.) (holding that section 11(1) of the Arms and Ammunition Act 75
of 1969 along with the Constitution placed a duty on the police to institute proceedings in
terms of section 11(1) to have an assailant's fire arm license revoked by the police
Commissioner, the failure of which resulted in the assailant subsequently using the firearm
to kill his wife and one child and to shoot and injure the plaintiff), affid, Minister of Safety
and Sec. v. Van Duivenboden 2002 (6) SA 431 (SCA) (S. Afr.) (providing a thoughtful and
thorough analysis of the impact of the Constitution in cases where the state fails to act);
Van Eeden v. Ministerof Safety and Sec. (Women's Legal Centre Trust, as Amicus Curiae),
2003 (1) SA 389 (SCA) (S. Afr.) (holding that the police did have a duty to protect the
plaintiff from violent harm and that it violated that duty when it negligently allowed a
violent sexual predator to escape from its custody resulting in the rape of the plaintiff at
gun point (basing the duty on the constitutionally inspired legal convictions of the
community; the right of freedom and security of the person entrenched in section 12(1)(c)
of the Constitution, along with section 7(2) of the Constitution, which imposed a duty on
the State to "respect, protect, promote and fulfill the Rights in the Bill of Rights;" the
section 39(1)(b) provisions which imposed the duty on the State to recognize its obligation
under international law to protect women against violent crime and against the gender
discrimination inherent in violence against women, as well as section 205(3) of the
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authoritarian and racist legal system that did not generally attempt to
justify its use of force, and was not generally held accountable for that use
of force, to a system that fosters a culture of justification, public
accountability and transparency.1°6 This section and the next address the

Constitution and the Police Service Act 68 of 1995 which made it clear that the functions of
the police included the maintenance of law and order and the prevention of crime; and
finally, the fact that there was no other practical and effective remedy available to the
victim of violent crime)), rev'g Van Eeden v. Minister of Safety and Sec. 2001 (4) SA 646
(T) (S. Aft.) (holding that the Constitution was irrelevant to the question as to whether the
police owed the plaintiff a legal duty when it negligently allowed a violent sexual predator
to escape from its custody and who later raped the plaintiff at gun point); Geldenhuys v.
Ministerof Safety and Sec. 2002 (4) SA 719 (CC) (S. Afr.) (applying the Constitution to find
a duty on the police to keep the plaintiff, who was in police custody when he sustained
serious bodily injuries, safe from physical harm and finding that they failed in their duty by
failing to timeously and properly investigate the nature and extent of the plaintiff's injuries
and to summon assistance); Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Sec. 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC)
(S. Afr.) (applying the Constitution to find that a legal duty may have existed on the police
and prosecutor and that they may have breached that duty when they recommended the
release without bail of a Mr. Coetzee without placing before the magistrate any information
regarding Coetzee's previous convictions and history of sexual violence where Mr. Coetzee
subsequently violently attacked the plaintiff), remanded to 2003 (2) SA 656 (CC) (S. Afr.)
(finding that the police and prosecution owed the plaintiff a legal duty and had failed in
carrying out the duty); N.K. v. Minister of Safety and Sec. CCT 52/04 (CC Jun. 13, 2005)
(holding the State vicariously liable for the rape of a stranded women by three on duty
uniformed police officers who offered to give her a ride home on the basis of the risk theory
and the objective approach to vicarious liability along with the constitutional rights of the
victim, the constitutional and statutory duties of the police, and the values of the South
African Constitution), rev'g N.K. v. Minister of Safety and Sec. 2005 (3) SA 179 (SCA) (S.
Afr.) (holding the State was not vicariously liable on the basis that the men were on a frolic
of their own, based on the interest theory and subjective approach to vicarious liability and
on the dubious exclusion of constitutional considerations).
106. As Etien Mureinik states, the new dispensation is based on "a culture of justification
- a culture in which every exercise of power is expected to be justified." E. Mureinik, A
Bridge to Where: Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights, 10 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 31, 32
(1994). Mureinik draws from Ronald Dworkin's notion that the overall point of law is to
justify state coercion. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 93, 109-10, 127, 190, 400
(1986). These ideals are found in the S. AR. CONST. 1996 § l(d), and affirmed in §
41(1)(c), which provides, "All Spheres of government and all organs of state within each
sphere must ... [provide] effective, transparent, accountable and coherent government for
the Republic as a whole." They are reiterated in Rail Commuters Action Group & Others
v. Transnet Ltd. t/a Metrorail& Others 2005 (2) SA 359 (CC) (S. Aft.). They were also used
in Premier, Western Cape v. FaircapeProp. Developers (Pty) Ltd. 2002 (6) SA 180 (CC) (S.
Afr.) in order to provide a remedy for a property developer for damage caused by a
negligent decision of one of the Premier's ministers to grant an application to remove a title
deed restriction on Faircape's property. The remedy was based in part on the notion of a
culture of justification and the need to hold the government accountable to the people for
harm caused by its negligence.
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last two sets of decisions referred to in note 105, namely those involving
Ms. Carmichele and Ms. N.K.
The Carmichele decisions are hard to compare with the Castle Rock
decisions on the level of doctrine, since the two draw from very different
constitutional mechanisms. They are similar because in both cases the
courts' respective interpretations of their constitutions have a direct impact
on either the creation or extension of a remedy, or the retraction of a
remedy. In both cases, the underlying values or spirit of the constitutions
either help forge a special relationship between victims and the police,
thereby altering the existing distribution of entitlement and duties, or they
hinder those attempts. One is set on transforming the relationship
between the government and its people by furthering a culture of
justification and accountability, while the other is set on conserving the
status quo.
In the case of Carmichele, the appellant, Ms. Carmichele, was the
victim of a vicious attack by Mr. Coetzee in the small, secluded village of
Noetzie.'O
On the day in question, Ms. Carmichele was visiting an
acquaintance's house in which she often stayed.' °8 Upon entering the
house she was immediately attacked by Mr. Coetzee (he apparently had
already broken in).'09 He attacked her with a knife and a pick axe handle,
breaking her arm.1 ° He dragged her around the house, threatening her,
and ordered her to turn around (assumedly to strike her down from
behind)."' When she refused he took out a knife and stabbed her in the
breastbone, causing the knife to buckle.'
When he lunged at her again
she managed to kick him and knock him off balance enough to escape
through the door and out on to the beach where she found help." Mr.
Coetzee was subsequently convicted of housebreaking and attempted
murder.14
The crucial facts in the case revolved around the events that took
place prior to that day, which allowed for those events to take place. Mr.
Coetzee had previously been convicted on charges of indecent assault and
was currently standing trial on charges of raping a woman in the very town
107. Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Sec. and Another 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at T 1
(S. Afr.). See id. at T T 5-24 for a full account of the facts in the Constitutional Court
judgment.
108. Id. at T T 21,23.
109. Id. at 9123.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Carmichele 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) (S. Afr.).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 11.
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Ms. Carmichele's attack took place.' 15 He was still in the grips of a
suspended sentence on the first conviction and was subsequently convicted
of attempted rape on the second."'
The central issue in the case revolved around the fact that despite Mr.
Coetzee's history of sexual violence, the police and the prosecutor had
recommended his release without bail and the prosecutor failed to place
before the magistrate any information regarding his previous
convictions." 7 He was thus released on his own recognizance, and the
attack on Ms. Carmichele took place during this time. This was in spite of
several interested parties pleading with the prosecuting authorities to
retain the perpetrator in custody pending the rape trial, including
complaints related specifically to the safety of Ms. Carmichele.'
She relied on the obligations imposed on the police by the Interim
Constitution,1 9 and on the State under the constitutional rights to life,
equality, dignity, freedom, and security of the person and privacy. 20 The
High Court dismissed the claim on the basis that she had failed to establish
that the police or prosecutor had wrongfully failed to fulfill a legal duty
121
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal
owed specifically to her.
similarly found no special relationship between the applicant and the
police or prosecutor that could give rise to a duty to provide her the
122
protection she required, thus finding no grounds for imposing liability.
The case went to the Constitutional Court as an application for special
leave to appeal from the order of the Supreme Court of Appeal on the
grounds that it, and the High Court, failed to develop the common law in
accordance with "the 'spirit, purport and objects' of the Bill of Rights" as
mandated by section 35(3) of the Interim Constitution and section 39(2) of
the Final Constitution. 123
Before addressing the Constitutional Court's decision in this case, it is
important to point out exactly what the Court did and did not do. The

115. Id. at

8-9.

116. Id. at 24.
117. Id. at T 20, 63, 74.
118. Id. at I15-17, 22.
119. S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993, § 7.
120. Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Sec. and Another 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at 951
(S. Aft.).
121. Id. at 945 (entering judgment at the end of the plaintiffs case); see also Carmichele v.
Minister of Safety and Sec. and Another 2000 (1) SA 489 (SCA) at 498 (S. Aft.).
122. Carmichele, 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at 945. (S. Afr.). The appeal was dismissed on
exception by the Supreme Court of Appeal. Id. at 945; see also Carnichele,2000 (1) SA 489
(SCA) at 498-499 (S. Afr.).
123. Carmichele,2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at 951 (S. Aft.).
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Court did: 1) rule that in all cases, the courts in South Africa must promote
the spirit, purport, and objects of the Constitution when developing the
common law;'24 2) require that this take place, starting with the trial court,
all the way through the Supreme Court of Appeal, and if appropriate, the
Constitutional Court;1 25 3) decide that this particular case was complex
enough to warrant a full hearing to determine if a legal duty existed;1 6 and
4) give guidance as to why the claimant's case may have merit under the
Constitution.1 27 However, the Court did not decide the case on the merits,
and thus, did not decide that a legal duty did in fact exist.
B. Courts Must Promote the Spirit, Purportand Objects of the Constitution
When Developing the Common Law.
The first point is important, because the courts in South Africa had
been largely ignoring the Interim and Final Constitutions' sections 35 and
39 when developing the common law of delict. Both advocates and judges
have, for the most part, failed to apply their minds to these provisions. It is
quite likely that judges have refrained from doing so because advocates
have not put such arguments before them. The Constitutional Court
recognized that to some extent lawyers may be to blame. 28 No doubt, for a
judge to apply his or her mind to a legal argument not before it cuts against
the adversarial tradition of the common law. In light of this tradition, a
judge may think it inappropriate, or at best discretionary, to raise an issue
sue sponte. 12
This is no longer the case. In paragraph 39 of its judgment, the
Constitutional Court stressed that the section 39(2) obligation is not
discretionary, as it stated: "it is implicit in [section] 39(2) read with
[section] 173 that where the common law as it stands is deficient in
promoting the [section] 39(2) objectives, the Courts are under a general
obligation to develop it appropriately.' ' 30 Section 39 places the duty on the
courts to develop the common law in light of the spirit, purport and objects

124. Embodied in S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993, § 35, and S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 39(2).
125. See generally Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Sec. and Another 2001 (4) SA 938

(CC) at 960-62 (S. Afr.).
126. See generally id. at 970-971.
127. See generally id. at 963-968.
128. See generally id. at 955-956, 963.

129. Note that Justice Scalia justified not certifying the question in Castle Rock to the
Supreme Court of Colorado on the basis that the parties had not requested it. See supra
note 43.
130. Id. at 955 (alteration in original).
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of the Bill of Rights. It thus places the duty on the courts to raise the issue
should counsel not do so."'
C. The Process of Developing the Common Law in Light of the
Constitution From the High Court Upwards is Important.
The second point is equally important, even if slightly controversial.
On the one hand, the Constitutional Court avoided providing desperately
needed justice for the victim by remanding the case to the High Court.
Further, no court is better situated than the Constitutional Court, with its
time, resources, and expertise, to decide how to best develop the common
law in line with the constitutional values. Yet, the Constitutional Court
referred the case back to the High Court to attempt the difficult task. The
Court justified this decisions based on: (1) a judgement about the
expertise of the different courts, (2) fairness to potentially losing litigants,
and d(3)
the most appropriate process for arriving at correct legal
•• 132
decisions.
First, the Court argued that both the High Court and the
Supreme Court of Appeal were better equipped for the task of developing
the common law than the Constitutional Court. 33 Secondly, it argued that
fairness to a potentially losing litigant generally requires that a court not sit
as court of first and last instance.'4 Finally, and directly related to the
former, if the Constitutional Court decided the matter as a court of first
and last instance, it would be denying itself the wisdom of the lower courts
as well as the reconsidering and refining legal issues and arguments that
take place when a case moves its way up to a court of last instance through
the process of appeal.'
This contrasts with the U.S Supreme Court's approach in Castle Rock,
which overturned the circuit court's decision to have the case heard on the
136
merits.
If the Supreme Court would have upheld the circuit court's
decision, it would not have guaranteed that Ms. Gonzales would have been
successful, but the facts and case would have developed more, possibly
leading to a more correct decision. Regardless of the fact that the case
would have been more developed if heard and appealed on the merits, as

131. Id.
132. These arguments sound remarkably similar to Justice Stevens's arguments in Castle
Rock for certifying the state law question to the Colorado Supreme Court and for deferring
to the decision of the Tenth Circuit. Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2816 n.6 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see also id. at 2815-16.
133. See generally Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Sec. and Another 2001 (4) SA 938
(CC) at 956, 960-963 (S. Afr.).
134. Id. at 960, 963.
135. See generally id. at 960-961.
136. See Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2810-2811 (2005).
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noted above, the circuit court and the Supreme Court of Colorado were
better placed than the U.S. Supreme Court to make the legal
determination in this case.
D. The Case Was Complex Enough to be Heardon the Merits
The third point is important in this case, because the Court would
have been required to uphold the decisions of the High Court and the
Supreme Court of Appeal and would not have sent the case back down for
reconsideration on the merits if it was not at least complex enough to
warrant the view that the common law may be in need of development in
this area.
The grounds for holding that the there may be a prima facia case are
based partly on the first point listed above, and the fact that the previous
courts had failed to add constitutional values into the traditional mix of
determining whether a legal duty existed. This is not to say that the test
for determining wrongfulness (legal duty) in delict is radically different
from the balancing of factors and interests, which has traditionally been
apart of the test for determining a legal duty, but as the Court states, "that
exercise must now be carried out in accordance with the 'spirit, purport
and objects of the Bill of Rights' and the relevant factors must be weighed
in the context of a constitutional State founded on dignity, equality and
freedom and in which government has positive duties to promote and
'
uphold such values."137
The point is both that this balancing should include
consideration of such sections as those regarding the rights to life, dignity
and freedom and security of the person, 118 and that the South African
S
139
constitutional provisions point towards a positive duty to prevent harm.
This distinguishes them from the American negative duty approach and
places them in line with the jurisprudence40 of the European Court and the
European Convention on Human Rights.1
Such positive duties with regards to the police can be found in both
the Interim Constitution, the Final Constitution and in the Police Act.'
The Interim Constitution provides in section 215 that "[t]he powers and
functions of the Service shall be - (a) the prevention of crime; (b) the
investigation of any offence or alleged offence; (c) the maintenance of law
and order; and (d) the preservation of the internal security of the

137. Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Sec. and Another 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at 957
(S. Afr.).
138. Id.
139. See generally id. at 957-958.
140. See generally id. at 957-959.
141. See generally id. at 964-965.
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Republic.', 4 2 The Final Constitution states in Section 7(2): "The [S]tate
must respect, protect, promote and [fulfill] the rights in the Bill of
Rights."143
Section 41 (1) (b) further provides that: "All spheres of government
and all organs of [S]tate within each sphere must[-]... (b) secure the wellbeing of the people of the Republic[.]" 1" Section 198(a) provides that:
"National security must reflect the resolve of South Africans, as
individuals and as a nation.... to be free from fear., 145 And, section
205(3) reads: "The objects of the police service are to prevent, combat and
investigate crime, to maintain public order, to protect and secure the
inhabitants of the Republic and their property, and to uphold and enforce
the law. 1 46 The duties of the South African Police Service are detailed in
the South African interim constitution of 1993. Chapter 14 section 215
reads:
The functions of the South African Police shall be, inter alia
(1)the
(2)the
(3)the
(4)the

preservation of the internal security of the Republic;
maintenance of law and order;
investigation of any offence or alleged offence; and
prevention of crime.147

Notice that while there is mandatory language, there is nothing as
specific as the Colorado legislation, which identifies specific duties to a
specific class of persons. Nonetheless, according to the Court, these duties
are accentuated in the case of women, both because of the historically
vulnerable place of women within South African society, 14' and because of
South Africa's international obligations under the Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women. 49 Added to

142. S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993, § 215.
143. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 7(2).
144. Id. at § 41(1)(b).
145. Id. at § 198(a).
146. Id. at § 205(3).
147. S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONSTI. 1993 ch. 14 s. 215, availableat
http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/legislation/1993/constil4.html?rebookmark=1 (last
visited Jan. 9, 2006).
148. Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Sec. and Another 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at 964965 (S. Afr.).
149. See id. at n.67. The Castle Rock majority opinion by Justice Scalia does not so much
as mention, much less respond to, the argument of the Brief of International Law Scholars
and Women's, Civil Rights and Human Rights Organizations as Amici Curiae in support of
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these considerations are the facts of the case relating to the actions of
police officer Klein in recommending to the prosecutor that Coetzee be
released on warning, as well as failing to provide the prosecutor with all

the relevant information that might establish a case against bail.5 When it
came to the potential liability of prosecutors, the Court noted an absence
of any duty explicitly laid in the Interim Constitution. Rather it noted a
general duty on prosecutors to be found in the common law.'

That duty

included presenting any information that was relevant to the decision,
whether to grant or not to grant bail, before the Court. The Court further
quoted the United Nations Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors to the

effect that:
In the performance of their duties, prosecutors shall:
(a)...
(b)Protect the public interest, act with objectivity, take
proper account of the position of the suspect and the victim
and pay attention to all relevant circumstances, irrespective
of whether they are to the advantage or disadvantage of the
suspect; .... 152
The Court then went on to note:
That said, each case must ultimately depend on its own
facts. There seems to be no reason in principle why a
prosecutor who has reliable information, for example, that
an accused person is violent, has a grudge against the
complainant and has threatened to do violence to her if

Respondents that both the customary international law norms to provide protection and
remedies for domestic violence and the obligations of the United States, as a party to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, should inform the Court's
consideration of the due process question. Brief of International Law Scholars and
Women's, Civil Rights and Human Rights Organizations As Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005) (No. 04-278), 2005 WL
328200. This is in keeping with his general disdain for international law. E.g., his dissenting
opinion in Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005) and his concurring in part and
concurring in judgment opinion in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 124 S. Ct. 2739,
2769-2776 U.S. (2004). In Sosa, he went so far as to state that "For over two decades now,
unelected federal judges have been usurping this lawmaking power by converting what they
regard as norms of international law into American law." Id. at 2776.
150. Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Sec. and Another 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at 965967 (S. Afr.).
151. Id. at 967.
152. Id. at 968.
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released on bail should not be held liable for the
consequences of a negligent failure to bring such
information to the attention of the Court.'53
The final stumbling block for the prosecutor to overcome was one of
causation. The Respondent argued that based on the magistrates
testimony he would not have held Coetzee in custody even if all the
114
According to the analysis of
relevant information was put before him.
the Court in paragraphs 75-77, this was not at all clear. It may well have
been that the magistrate would not have released Coetzee on bail had all
of the relevant evidence been brought before him."'
The Court concluded that in cases where the facts are complex and
the legal position is uncertain, it would be better for trial courts not to
dismiss cases on exception. 116 The reasons for restraint included making
decisions based on a developed record rather than hypothetical facts,
which may lead to more certain and final decisions at both the trial court
level and appellate level should they make it up on appeal, which in turn
In the end, the Court was
may curtail rather than prolong litigation.
"satisfied that the case for the appellant ha[d] sufficient merit to require
careful consideration to be given to the complex legal issues that it
raise[d]." 158
E. Guidance as to Why the Claimant's Case May Have Merit Given the
Constitution.

The guidance given by the Court falls short of dictating a final
decision in the case. There was much that still required findings on the
facts and a delicate balancing of the interests involved. Some of the
assistance given has been noted above in terms of the various possible
legal sources for finding a legal duty both within and outside the Interim
Constitution and the Final Constitution. The Court did attempt to put to
rest fears that such decisions may unduly fetter the discretion of public
authorities in the carrying out of their duties. This is to be accomplished
by a proper application of the balancing of interests inquiry and a
concomitant inquiry into the elements of foreseeability, or reasonableness

153. Id.
154. Id. at 968-969.
155. Id. at 968-969.
156. Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Sec. and Another 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at 970
(S. Afr.). This again contrasts with the Castle Rock decision.
157. Id. at 970-971.
158. Id.
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and proximity or remoteness, 5 9 with due consideration to pressures put
upon prosecutors and police in carrying out their duties.
In giving guidance, the Court noted that it is unclear how the outlined
constitutional duties on the State to respect, protect, promote and fulfill
the right in the Bill of Rights (particularly
with regard to women) are to be
1.
161

translated into private law duties.
In any case, the traditional
mechanisms for determining when justice and public policy required the
development of the common law "might well have to be replaced, or
supplemented and enriched by the appropriate
norms of the objective
1 62
Constitution.
the
in
embodied
value system
While acknowledging that there must be many ways to use section
39(2) in this area of delict,16 the Court did suggest the following possibility:
(a)to accentuate the objective nature of unlawfulness as one
of the elements of delictual liability, particularly in the
context of a bail hearing where the roles and general duties
of investigating officers and prosecutors are more clearly
defined than would normally be the case;

(b)to define it more broadly; and
(c)to allow the elements of fault and remoteness of damage
to play the greater role in limiting liability. 64
F. After Remand
When the case came back down to Justice Chetty on remand in
Carmichele v. Minister of Safety & Security,16 it was up to him to decide if
the omissions by the police and prosecutor were wrongful in light of
section 39(2) of the Final Constitution, and if so, whether the wrongful and
negligent omission was both the factual and legal cause of the harm to the
plaintiff.
Mr. Trengrove, advocate for the plaintiff, argued that the police and
prosecutors had failed to act to prevent the attack on Ms. Carmichele on
no less than three separate occasions: (1) in March, after Coetzee's arrest
for the rape and attempted murder, when it was known by the police and
159. Id. at 959-960, 962-963.
160. Id. at 968.
161. Id. at 962-963.
162. Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Sec. and Another 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at 962
(S. Afr.) (footnotes omitted).
163. Id. at 962.
164. Id. at 963.
165. Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Sec. and Another 2003 (2) SA 656 (CC) (S.
Afr.).
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166
prosecution that he had had a previous conviction for a sexual offence;
(2) in April, after the prosecutor had interviewed Coetzee, after his
attempted suicide, and after his return from a psychiatric evaluation in
which it was determined that he was fit to stand trial and that he had the
ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts;167 and (3) in June, after
the owner of the house in which the attack on Ms. Carmichele took place
had reported that Coetzee had been snooping around her house and had
attempted to break in.
During the course of the trial, the primary police investigator, Klein,
was found to have fabricated a set of false justifications for his failure to
oppose the release of Coetzee after his arrest for rape and attempted
murder of a Ms. Eurona in March. 169 Unfortunately, both Klein's
supervisor, Hugo, and the prosecutor, Louw, simply acquiesced in his
decision not to oppose bail, because of their esteem for Klein (or so they
claimed).
What is important was that both Hugo and Louw conceded
under cross examination that had they applied their minds, they would not
have acquiesced in Klein's decision. 17' Louw also conceded that she was in
error in agreeing to his release in April after his psychiatric exam,"' and in
not assuring that he was arrested after the trespass and attempted break-in
in June.'73
Counsel for the State attempted to argue that it was questionable
whether the propensity to commit a crime was a relevant factor in
opposing bail or whether the main consideration was if the accused would
174
appear for his trial. There was also an attempt to argue that because the
provisions of the Interim Constitution provide an accused has a right to
bail "unless the interest of justice determined otherwise," it was reasonable
for the police and prosecution to err on the side of bail or freedom. 17:5
Justice Chetty did not accept either argument, as it was clear to him
that it must have been apparent to the police and prosecution that Coetzee
116
either could not, or would not control his sexual aggression, and that

166. Id. at 663.
167. Id. at 669.
168. Id. at 670.
169. Id. at 670.
170. Id. at 666-668.
171. Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Sec. and Another 2003 (2) SA 656 (CC) at 669,
670 (S. Afr.).
172. Id. at 669.
173. Id. at 670.
174. Id. at 668, 669.
175. Id. at 669.
176. Id. at 668, 669.
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even if it was generally safe to err on the side of freedom, given the facts of
this case, they should have opposed bail.177 In fact, both Louw and Hugo
conceded that their decisions not to oppose bail were inconsistent with the
guidelines circulated by the Attorney General and the South African
Police Service under the Interim Constitution."'
Justice Chetty maintained that under the pre-constitutional common
law there would have been no legal duty on the police or the prosecutor
vis-A-vis the plaintiff. 79 Although it was not said, presumably this would
have been so because the relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendants was not sufficiently "special" for there to be a legal duty
towards her (as the Supreme Court of Appeal held in this case). As
questionable as this may be, both in terms of the legal requirement and the
satisfaction of the legal requirement given the above facts, the introduction
of the Constitution changed the legal analysis.
Turning to the inquiry under section 39(2) of the Final Constitution,
Justice Chetty followed the Constitutional Court's two stage analysis, first
determining if the common law was in need of development under section
39(2), and if it was in need of development, then determining how to make
that development.1 80 Counsel's arguments that there was no need for the
development given the amendments to the bail provisions in the Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 were not taken very seriously by the Court.18 As
Justice Chetty stated, "the question that arises for decision is whether, at
the time the plaintiff suffered
her loss, the relevant authorities discharged
182
their constitutional duty.,
Justice Chetty found the constitutional duty "enshrined in ss 10, 11
and 12 of the Constitution which entrench the right to dignity, life, and
freedom and the security of all persons," ' along with section 7(2) which
imposes a duty on the State to respect, protect, promote and fulfill the
rights in the Constitution9
Justice Chetty followed the Constitutional Court's guidance in noting
that it is the police and prosecutor who are the primary agencies for
protecting not only the public in general, but particularly women against
177. Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Sec. and Another 2003 (2) SA 656 (CC) at 669
(S. Afr.).
178. Id. at 670.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 670-671.
182. Id.
183. Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Sec. and Another 2003 (2) SA 656 (CC) at 671
(S. Afr.).
184. Id.
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violent crime.
held:

Following the Constitutional Court's dicta, Justice Chetty

that prosecutors are obliged, in the performance of their
duties, to 'protect the public interest, act with objectivity,
take proper account of the position of the suspect and the
victim and pay attention to all relevant circumstances
irrespective of whether they are to the advantage or
disadvantage of the suspect.'... [and that in the context of a
bail hearing, they have a duty] 'to place before the court any
information relevant to the exercise of the discretion with
regard to the granting or refusal of bail, and, if granted, any
appropriate conditions attaching thereto." 86
With this in mind, and following the submission by Mr. Trengrove for the
plaintiff; Justice Chetty revisited the conventional test for wrongfulness
and held that "[r]easonableness, on which the legal convictions of the
community are based, is now to be found in the Constitution and not in
some vague notion of public sentiment or opinion.', 87 He then went on to
quote supportive language from the decision of Justice Davis in Van
Duivenboden v. Minister of Safety & Security.'m This language indicates

that the Constitution and South African society are founded on the values
of dignity, liberty, and equality "and the added principle that public
189
authority must be transparent and accountable to the public it serves.'
The Court concluded that, "the enquiry [into] whether the State owed
the public in general, and women in particular, a duty at private law to
exercise reasonable care in the prevention of violent crime, the proper
application of the test requires one to attach primary significance to these
constitutional imperatives."' 9 Given the above facts, the imperatives
noted above, and the lack of a public law remedy, the Court held that
Klein, Hugo and Louw owed the plaintiff a delictually cognizable legal
duty to protect her against the risk of sexual violence perpetrated by
Coetzee. 9' In response to worries that this will open the floodgates of

185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 671.
188. Carmichele 2003 (2) SA 656 (SA) at 671-72 (S. Afr.) (quoting Van Duivenboden v.
Minister of Safety & Sec. 2001 (4) All SA 127 (CC) at 132 (S. Afr.)).
189. Id.at 672.
190. Id. (alteration added).
191. Id-
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litigation, Justice Chetty was careful to limit his decision to the facts of this
case, noting that the standard is simply to act with the care and diligence of
the ordinary police person and prosecutor.9 There was little question as
to their negligent failure to live up to the duties imposed given the facts of
the case.1 93 However, there still remained the question of whether their
failure was the factual and legal cause of the harm done to the plaintiff.1 94
It is worth noting that Justice Chetty made no reference to the need
for a "special relationship" between the plaintiff and the defendants,
which
••
195
was a requirement in the Supreme Court of Appeal's decision. Although
he mentioned the duty that the police and prosecutors owe to women "in
particular," his decision does not seem to rest on the special vulnerability
of women in South African society, or on any special duty to protect
women under South Africa's international obligations. 196
Thus, his
decision may be broader than the obiter dicta of the Constitutional Court,
which put considerable emphasis on the vulnerable position of women in
South Africa, their continued subordination through sexual violence, and
on South Africa's international duties under the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 197 One may
argue that under the Final Constitution no "special relationship" is
required, or that the Constitution itself embodies the "special relationship"
that is required. That special relationship is embodied in the new covenant
between the whole of the population of South Africa and its
government. 198 It may be argued that the constitutional regime is based on
a new and different kind of society - one that no longer accepts a mere
minimal laissez faire state where, at best, one has negative rights to be left
to one's own devices, but rather, one in which the people can legitimately
expect more from each other and more from the state by way of positive
duties. 199

192. Id.
193. See Id.
194. Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Sec. and Another 2003 (2) SA 656 (SA) at 672
(S. Afr.).
195. Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Sec. and Another 2001 (1) SA 489 (SCA) at 498
(S. Afr.).
196. See Carmichele,2003 (2) SA 656 (CC) at 672 (S. Afr.).
197. Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Sec. and Another 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at 96465 (S. Afr.).
198. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 §§ 7(2), 41(1)(b), 198, 205(3) (S.Afr.).
199. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 205 (S. Afr.). This is particularly apropos when it comes to
the duties of the police and prosecuting authorities to keep the people of South Africa safe.
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On the issue of causation, Justice Chetty noted that there are two
components, factual and legal.200 There would be little difficulty showing
factual causation based on an objective approach to what a reasonable
magistrate would have done if Klien, Hugo and Louw performed their
duties. 20 1 Although Justice Chetty noted the broad based policy inquiry for
legal causation in South Africa, 2°2 he did not conduct the inquiry, but
simply stated that he was "satisfied that there was a sufficiently close nexus
between the omissions and the harm occasioned to the plaintiff. 2 11 If this
lacuna was an error, the error was harmless, for the policy analysis would

simply be a repetition of the analysis that he conducted when determining
the issue of wrongfulness or legal duty above.
IV.

N.K.

One of the many tragedies of apartheid was not merely a breakdown
in the rule of law but the breakdown of confidence in those enforcing the

law. The injustices of apartheid law were often amplified by enforcement
that was arbitrary, cruel and corrupt with little regard for human rights or
due process.204

At the end of apartheid, there was an extreme lack of confidence in
the police. As Mark Malan notes, "[o]bviously, the majority population
205
did not hold the [South African Police] or its offshoots in high regard.,
200. Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Sec. and Another 2003 (2) SA 656 (CC) at 672
(S. Afr.).
201. Id. at 672-73. Justice Chetty noted that one could take either an objective or a
subjective approach to the question but that the subjective approach (what the actual
magistrate would have done) was not in the interest of the administration of justice, and
was not supported by the Constitutional Court. Id.
202. Justice Chetty followed the now classic decision of Int'l Shipping Co. (Pty) Ltd. v.
Bentley by quoting, "This enquiry, unlike the first, presents a much larger area of choice in
which legal policy and accepted value judgments must be the final arbiter of what balance
to strike between the claim to full reparation for the loss suffered by an innocent victim of
another's culpable conduct and the excessive burden that would be imposed on human
activity if a wrongdoer were held to answer for all the consequences of his default." Id. at
673 (quoting Int'l Shipping Co. (Pty) Ltd. v. Bentley, 1990 (1) SA 680 (A) (S. Afr.)).
203. Id. at 674.
204. Janine Rauch, Former Consult, The Center for the Study of Violence and
Reconciliation, Police Reform and South Africa's Transition, Presented at The South
African Institute for International Affairs Conference (2000), in RACE & CITIZENSHIP IN
TRANSITION SERIES (Braamfontein ed., Center for the Study of Violence & Reconciliation
2004), available at http://www.csvr.org.za/papers/papsaiia.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2005).
205. Mark Malan, Police Reform in South Africa: PeacebuildingWithout Peacekeepers, 8
AFRICAN
SECURITY
REVIEW
No.
3
(1999),
at
http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/8No3/PoliceReform.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2005). "[The]
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"In fact, by the time that the political transition to democracy began in
1990, the [South African Police] had become ' ,20 6 "an inefficient and
ineffective police
force," 207 "which had lost the confidence of the South
20 8
African public.
One would have hoped that with the end of apartheid and the
beginning of the 'new South Africa' that the police services would rise to
the call to serve and protect. Unfortunately, as the facts of the N.K. v.
Minister of Safety and Security (N.K.) case illustrate, all too often they

have not. 20 9 The essential facts of the case are simple, yet disheartening.
The applicant in the case was stranded in the early hours of the morning
and was in need of a ride home. 21° The applicant accepted a ride from
three uniformed on-duty police officers, who instead of assisting her and
protecting her, raped her and beat her before throwing her into some
bushes close to her home. 21' The three officers were convicted and given
life sentences for the rape and 10-year sentences for the kidnapping. 212 The
applicant originally brought her claim against all three assailants as well as
the Minister of Safety and Security, but decided to abandon the claim
against the three assailants. 213 Both the High Court and the Supreme
Court of Appeal had dismissed the case on the grounds that the Minister
of Safety and Security was not vicariously liable for the actions of the
police officers. 214 Ultimately, however, these decisions were unanimously
overruled by the Constitutional Court
of South Africa in an opinion
5
2
O'Regan.
Justice
by
down
handed

Institute for Security Studies Victim Surveys 1997/8 in Johannesburg, Durban, Cape Town
and Pretoria find that the public image of the police is generally poor, and that negative
views of the police are held equally by victims of crime and non-victims." Rauch, supra
note 204, at n. 18.
206. Id.
207. Keith Biddle et al., Evaluation of ODA/DFID Support to the Police in Developing
Countries: A Synthesis Study, UNIVERSITY OF WALES SWANSEA CENTRE FOR
DEVELOPMENT
STUDIES
(Mar.
1999),
at
http://www.swan.ac.uk/cds/pdffiles/Volume%2011%20Annexes%20E4-8%20%20F.pdf
(last visited Oct. 23, 2005).
208. Id.
209. N.K. v. Minister of Safety and Sec. CCT 52/04 (CC Jun. 13, 2005) at $1 2-7 available
at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/uhtbin/hyperion-image/J-CCT52-04.
210. Id.
1-3.
211. Id.
1-6.
212. Id. 6.
213. Id. [ 8.
214. Id.
1, 8 and 9.
215. Id. % 1.
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The constitutionally inspired approach to vicarious liability by Justice
O'Regan in N.K. has resulted in the adoption of the risk theory of
vicarious liability over the traditional interest theory of vicarious liability.
The courts in South Africa have gone back and forth between a narrow, or
conservative view of "scope of employment," and a broad, or liberal view
of "scope of employment" in frolic cases.216 The narrow view of "scope of
employment" is often associated with the interest theory, which limits the
liability of an employer for the conduct of its employees to that conduct
which furthers the interests of the employer. This is the more libertarian
view; and from this view, vicarious liability is an exception to the general
rule that one is to look out for herself or himself and no one else. The
Supreme Court of Appeal in N.K. v. Minister of Safety & Security briefly
captured the policy considerations behind the rule as:
[S]erving to maintain a balance between imputing liability
without fault (which runs counter to general legal
principles) and the need to make amends to an injured
person who might otherwise not be recompensed. From the
innocent employer's point of view, the greater the deviation
the less justification there can be for holding him or her
liable.217
Employers, whether private or public, are not their brothers' keepers and
the only way to justify holding them accountable for the actions of their
brothers or sisters is if their brother or sister is going about his or her
employer's business and furthering her, his, or its interests.
The
Supreme Court of Appeal adopted this view when 219
it held that the State
was not vicariously liable for the rape of the plaintiff.
In contrast, the worldview that underlies the risk theory of vicarious
liability sees the person as a cooperating member of the community, who
not only competes for whatever he or she can take from the community,

216. South African courts have continued to shift between a conservative and expansive
approach to frolic cases.The Supreme Court of Appeal itself has swung back and forth on
the issue. The unprincipled approach to this area of the law by the Supreme Court of
Appeal was criticized by this author in Christopher Roederer, Law of Delict, 2000 ANNUAL
SURVEY OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 328 (2000); and Christopher Roederer, Law of Delict,
2001 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 356 (2001).
217. N.K. v. Minister of Safety and Sec. 2005 (3) SA 179 (SCA) $ 4 n.181 (S. Afr.).
218. These values support what Neethling refers to as the interest or profit theory of strict
liability. NEETHLING ET AL., LAW OF DELICT 338, 348 (J.C. Knoble trans. & ed., 4th ed.
2001).
219. N.K., 2005 (3) SA 179 (SCA).
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but who is nurtured by that community and who has duties to the members
of that community. Those duties include being responsible for the dangers
and risks they impose on the community and paying for the harm caused
by the increased risks that they impose.22
In her opinion, Justice O'Regan drew heavily from the Constitutional
Court in Carmichele for a number of constitutional values that are relevant
to the present case.22 ' Those values are in part found in provisions of the
Constitution and The South African Police Service Act, which not only
give women like Ms. N.K. rights, but also impose duties on the State.222
These rights and duties include the rights to security of the person, dignity,
privacy and substantive equality, as well as the duties found in section 205
of the Constitution and the Preamble of The South African Police Service
Act. 221 Justice O'Regan, quoting Carmichele at length, emphasized the
importance of being free from sexual violence as a prerequisite for equality
and self-determination, and of the responsibilities of the police to protect
women from such violence. 224 She identified the policy reasons for the rule
as affording claimants efficacious remedies, inciting employers to be
proactive in preventing their employees from causing harm to the public,
as well as holding employers liable for damages only when it is fair to do
SO.

225

There are other reasons for vicarious liability not mentioned by
Justice O'Regan, including the balancing of equities between a victim and
an employer who: 1) either generally or specifically profits from the deeds
of her or his employees, 226 and/or; 2) who creates greater risks to the public

220. This underlies the risk theory of vicarious liability. See NEETHLING ET AL., supra
note 218, at 364, 374.
221. N.K. v. Minister of Safety and Sec. CCT 52/04 (CC Jun. 13, 2005) at 1 18 available at
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/uhtbin/hyperion-image/J-CCT52-04.
The Supreme
Court of Appeal in N.K. distinguished the impact of such cases as Carmichele, 2001 (4) SA
938 (CC) (S. Afr.), on the basis that those cases dealt with the issue of wrongfulness in
delict, with the implication that the section 39(2) of the Constitution mandate only applied
to the issue of wrongfulness or lawfulness. N.K., 2005 (3) SA 179 (SCA)
8. Justice
O'Regan rejected this limitation on the reach of the Constitution into the law of delict. Id.

19.
222. S. AFR. CONST. 1996; Police Service Act 68 of 1995.
223. N.K., CCT 52/04 at 18; S. AFR. CONST. 1996 c. 11 § 205; Police Service Act 68 of
1995 pmbl.
224. In fact, sexual violence was recorded as being the greatest single threat to the selfdetermination of South African women. N.K., CCT 52/04 at
18 (quoting Carmichele,
2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) 62 (S. Afr.)).
225. Id. 21.
226. See, e.g. DOBBS, supra note 27, at 910.

2005]

POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY
S

137

227

through his or her employees; 3) who provides the opportunity and/or
tools to her or his employees who cause harm;22' and
S 4)
229 who is in a better
place to not only bear and spread the cost of the harm; but 5) who is also

in a better place to deter the harmful conduct that takes place. 230 These are
the typical justifications found in common law jurisdictions and they
combine notions of corrective justice, economic efficiency, and deterrence
to outweigh the normal rule that one is not responsible for the delicts or
torts of others, but only responsible for her or his own delicts or torts.

227. Neethling et al. see this as the better justification for strict liability. NEETHLING ET
supra note 218, at 364, 374. I don't see any reason why the different reasons cannot be
combined. See Minister of Police v. Rabie, which comes close to elevating the risk theory to
the rule in the case and thereby supplanting the need for a "within the course or scope of
[one's] employment" duty test. 1986 (1) SA 117 (A) at 134-35 (S.Afr.). But see Minister of
Law & Order v. Ngobo, 1992 (4) SA 822 (A) (S. Afr.) (clarifiying that the risk justification
for the rule is not the same as the rule); see also Ess Kay Electronics Pte Ltd. & Another v.
FirstBank of S. Afr. Ltd., 2001 (1) SA 1214 at 10 (SCA) (refusing to follow the Rabie test,
arguing that: "[w]hat seems to require continual emphasis, therefore, is that the rule and
the reason for its existence must not be confused. The risk referred to, and considerations
of public policy, have to do with the reason for the rule. They are not elements of the rule
and they do not inform its content.)." However, it does not follow that the above two-part
test set out in Rabie was incorrect. See N.K. v. Minister of Safety and Sec. CCT 52/04 (CC
Jun.
13,
2005)
at
T
31
n.
39
available
at
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/uhtbin/hyperion-image/J-CCT52-04. It further does
not follow that the reasons for the rule 'do not inform its content.' "If risk to the public is
one of the underlying rationales for imposing vicarious liability then it follows that, all
things being equal, the more risk an employer places on the public the more reason for
imposing liability. Even the Court in Ngobo recognized it as one of the factors to be taken
into consideration (Ngobo at 828-834)." Christopher J. Roederer, Law of Delict, 2001
ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 348 (2001).
228. This is a subcategory of the risk theory. For the view under U.S. law see, e.g.
Restatement Second of Agency § 219(2)(d); DOBBS, supra note 27, at 910, 914 (referring to
the case of Costos v. Coconut Island Corp., 137 F.3d 46, 46 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding the
owners of an inn vicariously liable for the rape of a tenant by its employee based on the
view that the employment made the tort possible and/or aided in the accomplishment of the
tort)).
229. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability:A CriticalHistory of
the IntellectualFoundationsof Modern Tort Law, 14 LEGAL STUD. 447, 461 (1985).
230. See, e.g, Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231,
1231 (1984). This principle is broader than "control," particularly when an employer has a
range of devises available to her to deter harmful conduct, including, training, supervision
and other mechanisms or procedures to encourage safety and to curb harmful conduct. The
point is that an employer is often better placed than the employee him or her self to deter
or limit harmful conduct. Sykes's and Richard Epstein's work combine points four and five
above with arguments about the cost of identifying and suing employee plaintiffs, cheaper
insurance under vicarious liability and overall security against harm. RICHARD EPSTEIN,
TORTS 240-41 (1999).
AL.,
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Further justifications or principles that might justify the imposition of
vicarious suhiel
liability
include
spbi in the context of.231post-apartheid South. Africa
.232

such ideals as public accountability, non-delegable duties, human
rights, ubuntu,233 and the overall transformation of South African law and
society from one that is founded on the laissez faire values of freedom and
autonomy to one founded on equality, dignity, freedom, mutual respect,
and caring cooperation in the achievement of self determination for all
South Africans.234
In conclusion, Justice O'Regan held that the opportunity to commit
the crime arose because of the trust put in the policemen, a trust that was
constitutionally mandated, and the breach of that trust constituted a

231. Justice O'Regan discusses this value in the context of identifying the issue as a legal
issue rather than merely a factual issue but does not address it in the context of the holding
the State vicariously liable. In critiquing Mkhatswa v. Minister of Defence, 2000 (1) SA
1104 (SCA) (where the Court found the State was not vicariously liable for the actions of
its employees when one of its employees left the base with an unauthorized vehicle and an
indeterminate number of rifles that were in the possession and control of on duty sentries in
order to exact revenge on innocent victims), this author argued that the decision "[could]
not be in keeping with any notion of government accountability .... This would provide
little incentive for the Minister to impose discipline in the ranks, thus leading to less and
less accountability. This cannot be in keeping with the spirit of the Bills of Rights."
Christopher J. Roederer, Law of Delict, in 2000 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW.
232. For U.S. authority, see Stropes v. Heritage House Childrens Ct. of Shelbyville, 547
N.E.2d 244, 244 (Ind. 1989).
233. As Marius Pieterse writes, "The Nguni word ubuntu represents notions of universal
human interdependence, solidarity and communalism which can be traced to small-scale
communities in pre-colonial Africa, and which underlie virtually every indigenous African
culture." M. Pieterse, "Traditional" African Jurisprudence, in JURISPRUDENCE 441
(Christopher J. Roederer & D. Moellndorf eds.,2004). Justice O'Regan draws on the fact
that vicarious liability is a common feature of traditional society in South Africa. She notes
that the "kraalhead is liable for all the delictual acts of inhabitants of the kraal." N.K. v.
Minister of Safety and Sec. CCT 52/04 (CC Jun. 13, 2005) at T 24 n. 30 available at
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/uhtbin/hyperion-image/J-CCT52-04.
234. See S. AFR. CONST. 1994 § 1. See also, Karl Klare, Legal Culture and Transformative
Constitutionalism, 14 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 146 (1998); S. Woolman & D. Davis, The Last
Laugh: Du Plessis v De Klerk, ClassicalLiberalism, Creole Liberalism and the Application
of FundamentalRights Under the Interim and Final Constitutions, 12 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS.
36 (1996); H. Corder, Prisoner, Partisan and Patriarch: Transforming the Law in South
Africa 1985-2000, 118 S. AFR. L.J. 772 (2001); A. Chaskalson, The Third Brain Fischer
Lecture: Human Dignity as a FoundationalValue of our ConstitutionalOrder,16 S. AFR. J.
HUM. RTs. 193 (2000); D. Moseneke, The Fourth Brain Fischer Lecture: Transformative
Adjudication, 18 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTs 309 (2002); Christopher J. Roederer, Post-matrix
Legal Reasoning: Horizontality and the Rule of Values in South African Law, 19 S. AFR. J.
HUM. RTS. 57 (2003). Respect for the rule of law is fostered by holding the guardians of the
law responsible for the violations of the law by their employees. N.K., CCT 52/04 at 52.
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breach of their duties and an infringement of her rights to dignity and
security of the person. 2" The delict was held to be intimately connected

with the purpose of the employer rendering the State vicariously liable.236
V.

CONCLUSION

As noted above, is difficult to compare the South African approach to
these cases to the Castle Rock cases, or at least to the U.S. Supreme Court
decision. They appear a world apart. 2" For one, the status quo baseline is
238
the neutral, natural distribution of entitlements . 3 While for the other, the
status quo was a hold over from the authoritarian apartheid regime, which
was racist, sexist and often unaccountable for what it did. While the one
court struggles to hold back change, the other struggles towards change.
As the late Justice Mahomed stated in State v. Makwanyane, "[t]he South
African Constitution is different: it retains from the past only what is
defensible and represents a decisive break from, and a ringing rejection of,
that part of the past which is disgracefully racist, authoritarian, insular, and
,,239
repressive.
The legislature in Colorado attempted to apply this standard when

drafting the legislation addressed in Castle Rock by rejecting the history of
violence against women and children, and rejecting the history of police
indifference to their plight. It attempted a decisive break with that past in
order to provide victims an entitlement and to hold the police accountable.
While the Court would never come out and endorse this past, which

Colorado attempted to reject,

240

it has at least in part forced the people of

235. N.K., CCT 52/04 at 57.
236. Id.
237. There is also a contrast between a court that reaches out and draws from the
international community and one that tends to isolate itself from developments in the
international community.
238. Cass Sunstein states, "the status quo - what people currently have - is often treated as
the neutral and just foundation for decision. Departures from the status quo signal
partisanship; respect for the status quo signals neutrality. When the status quo is neither
neutral nor just, reasoning of this kind produces injustice" CASS SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION

(Harvard University Press 1993).

239. 1995 (3) SA 39 T 262 (CC) (S. Afr.).
240. Remember that Justice Scalia opens his opinion by recounting how horrible the facts
are in Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2802 (2005). Justice Scott
for the Supreme Court of Appeal in Natasha Kern. also had sympathy for the plaintiff that
he and his court denied relief, as he stated, "I have the deepest sympathy for the appellant,
as I do for the thousands of women who are raped every year in this country. Ideally, they
should all receive compensation, but that is something for the Legislature and beyond the

TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.

[Vol. 13:1

Colorado to retain and live with that part of its past. It has denied them
the most basic of all protections afforded to those living within the borders
of this country, the right of procedural due process, the right against the
arbitrary denial of that to which they are entitled.

jurisdiction of this court." Natasha Kern v. The Minister of Safety and Sec. 2005 (3) SA 179,
10 (SCA) (S. Afr.).

